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Abstract 
Social media plays a vital role in mobilizing social movement actors to produce and 
respond to a variety of issues. The development of the Internet and social media has transformed 
traditional social movements and provided a new means for people in modern societies to 
mobilize. While social media presents contemporary social movements with new opportunities, 
they also bring challenges. This study examines the “Save The Arctic” campaign launched by 
Greenpeace as a typical case of contemporary movements to explore how environmental 
movements intertwine with social networking platforms. Qualitative textual analysis of 
campaign-related content on Twitter is used to analyze who plays a role in mobilizing the 
campaign, what discourses social movement actors produce, and how activists use Twitter to 
promote campaign-related messages. The findings of this study provide insights into the 
changing relationship between social movement organizations and digitally networked 
individuals, how protest strategies shift through social media activism, how visual 
communication is used as part of social movement framing in digital forms of mobilization, and 
how the media environment for social movements shifts in the social media era.  
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Chapter One: Introduction 
The development of the Internet and social media has provided a new means for people 
to participate in controversial social discussions. In recent years, social media has played a 
significant role in mobilizing and organizing political and social protests worldwide, such as the 
Arab Spring and Occupy Wall Street (Browning, 2013; Castells, 2015; Vatikiotis, 2016). The 
adoption of new information and communication technologies by social movement actors has 
been predicted to transform traditional forms of political participation (Donk, 2004). It is argued 
that social movement organizations are losing their importance in mobilization (Castelles, 2015). 
Social media platforms, as a new set of communication tools, allow widely-dispersed individuals 
to connect and work together in a coordinated fashion, while also broadcasting their views and 
activities at home and abroad (Browning, 2013). The abilities of the Internet and social media in 
increasing the capacity of social movements to raise substantive issues and mobilize supporters 
has been documented (Stoddart & MacDonald, 2011; Earl & Kimport, 2011). In other words, 
social media plays a vital role in mobilizing social movement actors to produce and respond to a 
variety of issues. As with many social movements, environmental movements have also become 
intertwined with social media. Environmentalists increasingly employ online networks and social 
media to mobilize activists to communicate and take action on issues, such as climate change 
(Staggenborg & Ramos, 2016).  
In order to explore the interaction of social media and contemporary environmental 
movements, I examine the “Save the Arctic” campaign on Twitter as a case study in my research 
project. The “Save the Arctic” campaign was launched by Greenpeace in 2012 principally to 
protect the Arctic from oil drilling, and it received a large amount of attention worldwide. 
Greenpeace was established in Vancouver in 1971 and has now become the largest and best-
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know environmental organization in the world (Doyle, 2003). Greenpeace1 is also a media-
driven organization and has a long-standing history of creating its actions for the media (Doyle, 
2003). To gain insights into the relationship of social networking platforms and environmental 
movements, I examine the “Boycott Lego-Shell Partnership” campaign and the “Free the Arctic 
30” campaign as two critical events in the “Save the Arctic” campaign which were mobilized on 
Twitter. In particular, I provide insights into how Twitter was used by particularly interested and 
engaged members of the public to respond to, generate and engage in the mobilization of the 
“Boycott Lego-Shell Partnership” campaign and the “Free the Arctic 30” campaign. I use 
qualitative textual analysis to analyze campaign-related content on Twitter. The contribution of 
this research is to gain a better understanding of how social media is used by social movement 
actors to discuss and shape environmental issues.  
 
Research Problem 
My research answers the following question: What is the role of Twitter in social 
movements mobilization in the “Save the Arctic” campaign? Specifically, I ask: What unique 
qualities does social media, such as Twitter, bring to social movements? Does social media 
present new opportunities for social movements to disseminate and circulate messages? Are 
there limitations or concerns about the use of social networking platforms recognized by the 
research?  
I also examine other significant related questions: 
1. Who played a role in mobilizing the “Save the Arctic” campaign on Twitter?  
                                                 
1 Readers who have interest in looking at Greenpeace’s media-oriented political strategy can consult: Doyle, A. 
(2003). Arresting images: Crime and policing in front of the television camera. Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press. 
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2. What kind of discourses were used to mobilize around oil conflicts on Twitter during the “Save 
the Arctic” campaign, and how did the Twitter content shape the campaign? In other words, I 
examine how written and visual content was circulated by activists on Twitter in order to 
“identify injustices, attribute blame, propose solutions, and motivate collective action” 
(Staggenborg & Ramos, 2016, p. 25). 
3. How was Twitter used by activists to extend and promote campaign-related messages in the 
“Save the Arctic” campaign?  
This research project enriches the existing academic research in how social media is used 
by social movements to address environmental issues. Specifically, the study provides insights 
into how social media shifts protest culture, including what social media strategies activists use 
to protest, and what new opportunities and limitations social media presents for social 
movements.  
 
The Oil Controversy in the Arctic  
The Arctic plays a significant role in influencing the world’s climate, ecosystems and 
human activities (Wright, 2014). The Arctic also contains a number of animals, plants, and 
human communities, including Inuit communities who have lived in the Arctic for thousands of 
years (Wright, 2014). Ecological changes in the Arctic do not only threaten local nature and 
human communities, but they also have global impacts on climate change, weather patterns, sea 
levels, fisheries, shipping and tourism, and so on (Dodds, 2010; Cunsolo Willox, 2012; Wright, 
2014).  
In the recent decades, the melting ice in the Arctic has become a growing concern 
because what occurs as Arctic and Antarctic ice melts shapes the broader climate of the Earth 
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(Dodds, 2010; Wright, 2014). Polar ice in both the northern and southern hemispheres plays a 
vital role in stabilizing Earth’s average temperature and maintaining a comfortable environment 
to sustain life (Wright, 2014). The reduction of polar ice is accelerating global warming (Wright, 
2014). The primary culprit of the melting of Arctic and Antarctic ice sheets is increasing global 
temperatures (Dodds, 2010; Wright, 2014). Rising global temperatures are caused by the release 
of invisible greenhouse gases, such as carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, and water vapour 
(Wright, 2014). These gases are a major driver of global climate change (Dodds, 2010; Wright, 
2014). The burning of fossil fuels (coals, oil, and natural gas) is a critical factor that results in the 
increase of the concentration of these greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, as suggested by the 
Arctic Climate Impact Assessment’s report on Impacts of a Warning Arctic (2004).  
Climate change has not only caused many negative impacts on weather patterns, wildlife, 
vegetation, water and food quality, and access and availability of land, but it has also brought 
many risks to human health and well-being (Cunsolo Willox et al., 2012). Indigenous people, 
frequently neglected in global discourses, have been experiencing these consequences (Cunsolo 
Willox, 2012). This reality eventually results in alterations to their cultures, livelihoods, and 
land-based activities (Cunsolo Willox, 2012). 
While oil production and consumption are a primary source of environmental pollution 
and climate change (Sinclair, 2011), oil exploration has become one of the main constituents in 
the economic structure of coastal regions, bringing economic benefits to many countries (Carter, 
2007; Wright, 2014). The energy potential of the Arctic zone is sufficiently significant to be of 
interest to the five Arctic coastal states (Canada, Denmark/Greenland, Norway, Russia and the 
United States), Nationalized Oil Companies (NOC), such as ROSNEFT, and Independent Oil 
Companies (IOC), such as Shell and BP (Dodds, 2010). For instance, Greenland authorities 
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awarded 13 exploration licenses to oil and gas companies, including Shell, Nunaoil, Conoco 
Phillips and Cairn Energy, and the government expected that there would be 20 wells drilled off 
the coast over the next decade (Shadian, 2014). The great interest of these northern communities 
and oil corporations in oil drilling comes from revenue streams and employment opportunities 
that are created by oil and gas (Dodds, 2010). Due to approximately 20% of the world’s 
remaining undiscovered oil and gas resources being located in the Arctic and the increased 
accessibility of fossil fuel reserves caused by shrinking Arctic ice, government officials and oil 
industries are exploring the opportunity to exploit oil and gas as well as other resources in the 
new Arctic fields (European Parliament, 2008; Wright, 2014).  
However, environmental security has been widely recognized and environmental 
destruction has been considered to be a threat to “soft power” security (Shadian, 2014). Soft 
power relies on the capacity of preferences of others (Lovric, 2016). Unlike hard power, such as 
military or economic forces, soft power is the ability of one country to attract other countries to 
admire its values or expect to seek its level of prosperity (Lovric, 2016). In other words, a 
country’s attitude to conservation has become an important factor that influences whether or not 
the country can receive respect from others. In response to the climate change crisis, 
international environmental collaboration is required in the Arctic (Shadian, 2014). Policy-
makers and organizations from World Wildlife Fund (WWF) to European Union (EU) have 
started demanding better Arctic governance to save the region from environmental devastation 
(Shadian, 2014). The Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC), a transnational organization, was 
founded to develop a comprehensive environmental policy for protecting the Arctic environment 
(Shadian, 2014). ICC assembled international efforts by launching a petition in 2005 to combat 
climate change and the violations of the Inuit’s human rights caused by global warming.  
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As can be seen from this analysis, oil conflicts have become one of the main 
environmental concerns in contemporary societies, and the Arctic has drawn particularly 
attention from international environmental movements as a site of contention over oil 
development. The “Save the Arctic” campaign was organized to arouse people’s awareness of 
severe environmental changes in the Arctic and to motivate people to protect the Arctic.  
 
Thesis Outline 
     This thesis consists of five chapters. Following this first introductory chapter, in Chapter 
Two, I provide a contextual overview of the history of digital activism, as well as literature that 
directs the theoretical approach employed in this research. This chapter mainly focuses on ideas 
related to the changing relationship between social movement organizations and networked 
individuals in the social media age, the employment of framing theories in transnational activist 
networks through social media technologies, and the shifting media landscape of the social 
media era. This chapter provides the theoretical context for my study of the dynamics of social 
media activism through the case of the “Save the Arctic” campaign.  
In Chapter Three, I explain the methodological approach used to address my research 
problems. This chapter provides detailed information about my sampling strategies and the 
qualitative textual analysis of the Twitter content relevant to the “Boycott Lego-Shell 
Partnership” campaign and the “Free the Arctic 30” campaign as two critical events within the 
broader “Save the Arctic” campaign.   
In Chapter Four, I provide an analysis of my research data about each campaign. I 
examine both critical events from three dimensions: social actors, campaign targets, and the 
social use of Twitter. In terms of social actors, I look at who played a role in mobilizing both 
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campaigns and how social movement actors were intertwined with Twitter. Regarding campaign 
targets, I examine those who were framed as the targets of claim-making and mobilization in 
both campaigns on Twitter. Then, I use framing theories to examine how the targeted issues were 
interpreted and mobilized on Twitter. Finally, I discuss the social use of Twitter. I analyze how 
activists used the tactic of link sharing on Twitter to interact with other platforms in order to 
enrich and promote campaign-related messages.  
In the final chapter, I synthesize the findings of the two critical events by teasing out their 
similarities and differences. This chapter contributes insights into the role of social media in 
mobilization around environmental issues by offering a critical discussion of the uses of Twitter 
around the issue of Arctic oil drilling in the “Save the Arctic” campaign. I also outline the 
limitations of my research project and suggest areas for future research.  
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Chapter Two: Literature Review 
In this chapter, I provide an overview of the literature that examines the way social media 
changes the dynamics of social movements through the evolution of digital activism. I begin 
with a section on the historical context explaining key events that happened in different stages of 
digital activism. This helps explain how the Internet and social media technologies play a key 
role in mobilizing contemporary social movements. Then, I discuss the contemporary media 
landscape of repertories of communication in which social movement actors mobilize social 
movements, and how this media environment changes relationships between social movement 
organizations and digitally networked individuals. Finally, I illustrate what strategies are 
employed to shape social movements and to mobilize movement audiences and targets. I also 
explore how effective the role of social media is in mobilizing social movements. 
 
Social Media and Social Movements  
Since the early 21st century, social networking sites have greatly transformed traditional 
social movements and become increasingly prominent within contemporary social movements. 
Social movement actors traditionally mobilize social issues through mass media, such as print 
and broadcast media, but they increasingly give more importance to new information and 
communications technologies, such as social media platforms (Earl & Kimport, 2011).  
Going beyond a one-way process of information sharing provided by mass media (e.g. 
newspaper, radio, television), social media emphasizes a collaborative and participative two-way 
dialogue between a variety of content creators and audiences (Stoddart & MacDonald, 2011). 
The traditional ways of communication between mass media and the general public indicates the 
relationship of mass media and the public is asymmetric because media audiences rarely have the 
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opportunity to offer feedback to media producers (Lasswell, 1971; Stoddart & MacDonald, 2011; 
Mattoni, 2012). It means mass media as information senders have more control over the 
communication flow than media audiences as information receivers (Mattoni, 2012). However, 
the contemporary communication flow is generated through the interaction of diverse individuals 
(Mattoni, 2012). This communication mode based on the Internet and social media technologies 
highlights a mutual communication that is accomplished between senders and receivers. In other 
words, the general public potentially now have more influence over the communication flow 
than before.  
The implementation of new communication and media technologies in social movements 
has a long history (Vatikiotis, 2016). In 1994, the Zapatista movement launched by Indigenous 
people in Mexico against the Mexican government played a vital role in demanding an expansion 
of Indigenous rights and recognition from the local government and the world (Godelmann, 
2014). The Zapatista uprising in Mexico is widely recognized as the prototype of transnational 
activism where internet technologies play an important role in diffusing the messages of 
Indigenous people to global audiences (Schulz, 2014; Vatikiotis, 2016). In 1999, another 
transnational protest, the Anti-WTO Demonstration, unfolded in Seattle. Protestors criticized the 
WTO’s policies and transmitted the information to the world with the use of cell phones, irc-
chats, online forum and other Internet technologies (Karatzogianni, 2015). After the disastrous 
terrorist attacks on the Twin Towers in New York on September 11, 2001 and leading up to the 
2003 invasion of Iraq, a series of anti-war activities against the Iraq war began to emerge across 
the world. Internet technologies helped mobilize a coalition of ten million people to engage in 
the peace movement and quickly form a globally connected movement against the war 
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(Karatzogianni, 2015). E-mail lists, group text messages, chat rooms, the blogging and other 
Internet-based techniques were used by anti-war groups to organize the movement.  
In the next few years, more protests were coordinated to fight for global justice and 
democratic political systems (Karatzogianni, 2015; Vatikiotis, 2016). In 2004, the Ukrainian 
Orange Revolution was launched by a large number of people to protest against fraud in the 
presidential election with the employment of mobile phones and the Internet (Vatikiotis, 2016). 
In 2008, a variety of protests against the financial crisis emerged in Iceland (Vatikiotis, 2016). 
The Internet helped disseminate the information to the world and accelerate the mobilization of 
global audiences in response to the Icelandic government performance (Vatikiotis, 2016). In the 
meantime, Barack Obama recognized the value of social networking technologies and won the 
US presidential election with the aid of social media activism (Karatzogianni, 2015). In 2011, the 
Arab Spring uprisings spread out and the protestors used social media to stay networked and 
organized (Castells, 2015; Vatikiotis, 2016). During the Arab Spring revolutions, Twitter played 
a central role in disseminating the protesting information to individuals across Arabic regions 
and unifying them to boycott the old authoritarian regimes and demand new democratic political 
changes (Castells, 2015; Vatikiotis, 2016). At the same time, the outcry against social and 
economic inequality was widely spread on Twitter and people in the U.S. launched Occupy Wall 
Street movement in response to their outrage. The hashtag #occupywallstreet was then 
distributed and circulated by the networked activists on the Internet. Twitter played an essential 
role in mobilizing individuals by providing a real-time network to promote their communication 
(Castells, 2015). According to Karatzogianni (2015), other digital activism related to feminist, 
LGBT and environmental movements also started coming to public attention after 2011.  
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In the last decades, protest culture has shifted from traditional social movements that rely 
on physical co-presence and centralized organizations to contemporary social movements which 
benefit from participatory networks of individuals and the construction of collective identities 
established by the Internet and social media technologies.  
 
Repertoires of Communication  
Since 1990s, the emergence of information and communication technologies, such as 
social networking platforms, has transformed the mainstream-dominant mass media system to a 
multifaceted media environment for social movements (Mattoni, 2012). A variety of media 
technologies are available for social movement actors to mobilize contemporary social 
movements (Mattoni, 2013).  
Before the Internet and social media technologies become prevalent, mainstream mass 
media play a central role as gatekeeper between citizens and political actors in mobilizing around 
social issues (Mattoni, 2012). For instance, Greenpeace always stresses the significance of media 
coverage in its political strategy, and the group makes strategic use of mass media in movements 
(Carroll & Ratner, 1999). Despite the commitment to drawing mass media attention to 
mobilization, a few difficulties hinder activists to devise tactics that operate within the norms of 
mass media  ( Carroll & Ratner, 1999; Mattoni, 2012). First, the opinions of mainstream mass 
media on social movements are usually negative (Mattoni, 2012). On one hand, mainstream mass 
media is considered to be biased towards social movements because it is largely controlled by 
institutional political actors who can benefit from denying their association with contentious 
issues mobilized by activists (Mattoni, 2012; Castells, 2015). For instance, mainstream media in 
Italy has strong roots in literature and politics in which many journalists stress more on 
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expressing their opinions than reporting facts (Hallin & Mancini, 2004). On the other hand, the 
news-making process in mainstream mass media leads to misleading representations of these 
issues (Mattoni, 2012; Staggenborg & Ramos, 2016). In other words, the limited amount of time 
or space in mainstream media outlets and the eager of journalists to attract audiences with big 
stories cause a lack of real understanding of protest events and overshadow some aspects of 
protests that activists consider to be much more important (Mattoni, 2012). As such, the 
relationship between social movements and mass media is considered to be a relationship of 
asymmetrical dependency (Gamson & Wolfsfeld, 1993; Carroll & Ratner, 1999). In other words, 
social movements usually need media coverage for exposure more than mass media need to 
cover movements for news reportage (Staggenborg & Ramos, 2016). The media lies at the center 
of a mass communications network, and this brings media a wide range of options for news 
reportage (Carroll & Ratner, 1999; Gamson & Wolfsfeld, 1993). However, social movements 
had few communication channels but mass media for spreading their messages to audiences 
before the prospering of social media (Carroll & Ratner, 1999; Gamson & Wolfsfeld, 1993). As 
a result, proliferating social movement organizations and social issues were competing for 
limited media space (Dauvergne & Neville, 2011).  
Despite the difficulties of gaining mass media attention for movements, activists continue 
to consider mainstream media as important and seek media coverage (Corrigall‐Brown, 2016; 
Staggenborg & Ramos, 2016).  This is perhaps because media attention can help legitimize a 
movement’s cause and enhance exposure for contentious issues of concern to the general public 
(Stoddart & MacDonald, 2011; Seguin, 2016; Corrigall‐Brown, 2016; Staggenborg & Ramos, 
2016). This helps activists reach a much larger and diverse audience, which is beyond movement 
organizations’ own outreach ability, and also helps engage counter-movement actors and 
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governments in public debate (Stoddart & MacDonald, 2011; Seguin, 2016; Corrigall‐Brown, 
2016; Staggenborg & Ramos, 2016).  
Due to the difficulties of drawing mass media attention to social movements, social 
movement actors turn to social media and organizational websites to mobilize. Social media 
challenges the dominant influence of mass media. Readers do not only receive mainstream media 
messages, but they also have the access to other viewers’ comments as recommendations which 
potentially enhance their support for mass media’s views or disqualify the persuasive effects of 
mass media content (Neubaum & Krämer, 2017; Katz & Lazarsfeld, 1955). In other words, the 
Internet and social media offer audiences greater independence to process and evaluate the 
information from mass media.  
Social networking sites and organizational websites offer potential for social movements 
to speak directly to the general public across the globe (Donk, 2004; Earl & Kimport, 2011). The 
Internet and social media provide individuals with communication power to become their own 
publishers and broadcasters (Rainie & Wellman, 2012; Mattoni, 2012). Web 2.0 technologies 
(i.e. unmediated interactive social media) empower individuals with autonomous capacity to 
circumvent the control of governments and corporations in communication and to articulate 
discourses and mobilize activities around social issues, which weakens the dominant influence of 
mainstream mass media and promotes self-representations in social movements (Earl & Kimport, 
2011; Uldam & Askani, 2013; Castells, 2015; Ceron & Memoli, 2016). On one hand, the Internet 
and social media provide the general public with opportunities to frame their own demands 
(Staggenborg & Ramos, 2016). For instance, activists initiated the Idle No More movement 
through a Facebook thread and organized flash mobs by using Twitter handles in the movement 
(Staggenborg & Ramos, 2016). In other words, social media offers tools for activists to present 
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their own movement messages and promote individual engagement in mobilization. Also, 
websites of environmental organizations generally present a broader scope of environmental 
issues and offer more detailed discussion of their issues than mass media (Stoddart & 
MacDonald, 2011; Stoddart, Ramos, & Tindall, 2015).  
In addition, the Internet and social media offer individuals access to a greater variety of 
information and more extended audiences with less cost in time and money (Earl & Kimport, 
2011; Rainie & Wellman, 2012). On one hand, information now becomes extensively accessible 
and abundant on social media and it is always within reach (Serres, 2014). The Internet and 
social media technologies foster a continuous circulation of information updates within the 
media network (Rodgers & Scobie, 2015). These technologies also help activists diffuse their 
messages more quickly, which makes it more difficult for the government to block (Earl & 
Kimport, 2011). In other words, activists can use social media to keep audiences constantly 
informed of the progress of their mobilization and comments from audiences, which enables 
activists to mobilize social movements more effectively. For example, electronic mail, mailing 
lists, websites, electronic forums and other online applications provide powerful tools for 
coordinating activities among geographically dispersed individuals (Donk, 2004). These tools 
allow activists to access and participate in quick and easy online collective action with low risk 
and low cost, such as signing online petitions and email campaigns, which can help social 
movements recruit potential participants (Earl & Kimport, 2011). As such, the Internet and social 
media enable people to afford to absorb the costs of participation, so that they are more likely to 
participate in social movements (Earl & Kimport, 2011).  
On the other hand, the interactive Web 2.0 environment provides numerous opportunities 
for individuals to explore and develop new relationships, even among the most remote strangers 
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(Rainie &Wellman, 2012). The Internet and social media break the limitation of geographic 
distance and link social movement actors to each other across great distances (Rodgers & Scobie, 
2015). Social media allows individuals to maintain contacts with weaker ties, such as neighbours 
and coworkers who are actually considered to be critical sources of information and support 
(Rainie & Wellman, 2012). When information is broadcast outside of personal relationship 
circuits, it can also draw public attention to salient social issues within their communities 
(Rodgers & Scobie, 2015). In other words, social media enables interactive and self-configurable 
communication among widely-dispersed individuals (Castells, 2015), and allows them to connect 
and work together in a coordinated fashion (Browning, 2013). As a result, the Internet and social 
media enable people to potentially function better in a complex environment (Earl & Kimport, 
2011; Rainie & Wellman, 2012). 
Despite the benefits of being cheap, accessible, interactive and delocalized, the Internet 
and social media are more likely to reach like-minded audiences who already have sympathy 
towards the conflict rather than the public who mainly receive messages about social movements 
from mass media (Wilheim, 2000; Bennett & Iyengar, 2008; Corrigall‐Brown, 2016). Therefore, 
the Internet and social media have the advantage of activating existing support, rather than 
persuading larger audiences (Lee & Chan 2013; Lee, 2015).   
As discussed in this section, social movements operate within a more complex and 
multifaceted media environment, or repertoires of communication (Mattoni, 2013). The 
repertoire of communication is defined as the set of relational media practices which stress the 
interaction of social movement actors and a series of communicative resources, such as media 
technologies, media outlets and media professionals (Mattoni, 2013). For example, content 
created by authors on websites, such as online news articles, and user-generated content, such as 
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comments made by readers on news articles, are both being seen on social media platforms 
(Walther & Jang, 2012; Neubaum & Krämer, 2017). The concept of repertoires of 
communication implies that the use of social media has not replaced the use of mass media in 
contemporary social movements. Instead, social media helps create a more complex and 
multifaced media landscape for movements to navigate and make use of. In other words, a 
convergence of mainstream media coverage and interactive communication has been widely 
witnessed on social media platforms.  
 
Social Movement Organizations and Networked Individuals  
Unlike most traditional social movements, modern social movements, such as the Arab 
Spring and Occupy Wall Street movements, do not “recognize any leadership and reject all 
formal organizations”, and they also no longer need organizations to organize collective action 
(Castells, 2015, p. 4; see also Earl & Schussman, 2003; Benkler, 2006; Shirky, 2008). The 
concept of formal leadership refers to traditional “rational” or “personalized” leadership and 
“vertical authority” (Castells, 2015, p. 181). This is because that the Internet and social media 
have greatly reduced the cost of creating, organizing and participating in protests, which breaks 
the barriers to collective action and makes it possible for individuals to mobilize (Shirky, 2008; 
Earl & Kimport, 2011). In other words, the mobilization and coordination of contemporary social 
movements can rely on the capacity of a networked society facilitated by the Internet and social 
media technologies (Castells, 2015). This digitally networked society witnesses a process in 
which “the revolutionary change from small groups to broader personal networks has been 
powerfully advanced by the widespread use of the Internet and mobile phones” (Rainie & 
Wellman, 2012, p. 8). The new social networking system is called networked individualism in 
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which “people function more as connected individuals and less as embedded group members” 
(Rainie & Wellman, 2012, p. 12). Networked individuals are empowered by the Internet and 
social media because these technologies allow them to access and collect a variety of 
information, explore and build new connections with individuals who share common interest or 
face similar experiences, assess different advice and options in the decision-making process, and 
voice their own opinions (Rainie & Wellman, 2012). In other words, social media usage is 
considered to be able to decentralize the leadership of social movement organizations and endow 
individuals with more autonomy and equality to mobilize social movements (Castells, 2015). 
Social media has spurred a demand for new forms of participatory planning and self-organizing 
governance by individual audiences (Kleinhans, Van Ham, & Evans-Cowley, 2015).  
However, apparently spontaneous and leaderless movements can actually be organized 
by artificial grassroots organizations that are sponsored or created by corporations and 
governments (Cho, Martens, Kim, & Rodrigue, 2011; Greenberg, Knight, & Westersund, 2011; 
Wear, 2014). This activity is defined by researchers as “astroturfing” in which third parties 
disguise their involvement as spontaneous and natural grassroots to either support or disagree 
with certain beliefs or perspectives in order to manipulate political discourses and deceive 
audiences (Cho et al., 2011; Greenberg et al., 2011; Wear, 2014). Cho et al. (2011) noted an 
example of astroturfing activities in their research that an alleged large-scale campaign creating 
and funding “think tanks” to disseminate false information about global warming and climate 
change science was actually sponsored by ExxonMobile Corporation. Not only governments and 
corporations but also social movement organizations increasingly use public relation tactics and 
rely on corporate communication consultants to influence key audiences and policy-makers 
(Dimitrov, 2008). It is difficult to distinguish effective astroturfing organizations from genuine 
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grassroots organizations, especially in the age of the Internet and social media (Wear, 2014). The 
use of a wide range of software makes it possible for a few people to produce the illusion of a 
large number of people participating in digital activism (Wear, 2014). The emergence of 
astroturfing activities has definitely challenged the idea of spontaneous and self-managed 
mobilization and urged social movement researchers to rethink who are the leaderless coalitions 
of networked individuals in the context of the digital media sphere.  
Contemporary social movements lay stress on the power of network individualism, but 
absolute autonomy and leaderless participation do not seem realistic (Gramsci, Hoare & Smith, 
1971). In fact, so-called spontaneous and leaderless social movements are highly organized 
(Gerbaudo, 2012). These contemporary social movements are mediated by various 
communication technologies, and this is developing types of “soft, indirect, and invisible or 
‘choreographic’ forms of leadership” (Gerbaudo, 2012, p. 163). The leaders or organizers in the 
movement are essentially those participants who devote lots of effort to the movement 
(Gerbaudo, 2012). Gerbaudo (2012) suggested that social actors should not neglect “inequalities 
and asymmetries” embedded in mobilization where “there are people who lead and people who 
follow” (p. 165).  
Despite claims about leaderless social movements, many researchers still argue that 
social movement organizations remain important to social movements (Gerhards & Rucht 1992; 
Earl & Kimport, 2011; Mercea, 2012). Social movements can succeed and endure partly because 
they encompass various organizational structures and capacity for devising strategies and tactics 
(Staggenborg & Ramos, 2016). For example, more centralized and formalized organizations 
commonly use institutionalized tactics, such as legislative lobbying, while decentralized and 
informal structures tend to conduct direct action (Gerlach & Hine, 1970; Freeman, 1975; 
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Staggenborg & Ramos, 2016). Social movement organizations do not only encourage audiences 
to take action by providing them with incentives, such as offering free rewards in exchange of a 
donation, but also play a critical role in creating favourable opportunities in which individuals 
can collectively protest and participate in decision-making processes (Klandermans, 2004; Earl 
& Kimport, 2011; Staggenborg & Ramos, 2016). Especially in terms of high-risk action, social 
movement organizations can bring a degree of commitment and trust to movement participants 
that cannot be produced by self-mobilized individuals (Mercea, 2012). As a result, social 
movement organizations, such as Greenpeace, become important spokespersons and signalling 
agencies in a movement (Snow & Benford, 1988; Holzer, 2010; Earl & Kimport, 2011). In other 
words, social movement organizations can transform individual decisions into public statements, 
which allows personal choices to influence and alter the behaviour of governments and 
corporations (Holzer, 2010).  
Social movement organizations can work to mobilize and activate each other (Earl & 
Kimport, 2011), and this process is also known as the process of mesomobilization (Morris, 
1984; Gerhards & Rucht 1992). Social media does not change the nature of how people decide to 
participate in social movements (Horton, 2004; Bennett, 2003a, 2003b, 2004a, 2004b). Rather, 
social media helps activists become more informed and connected while promoting the 
engagement of protest actors in the movements (Horton, 2004; Bennett, 2003a, 2003b, 2004a, 
2004b). In other words, social media can help social movement organizations work better and 
achieve further goals in mobilization (Earl & Kimport, 2011). Social media enables social 
movement organizations to connect with each other more easily, and these umbrella 
organizations help scope and plan the enlargement of their protests through their connections 
(Bennett, 2003a, 2003b, 2004a, 2004b; Earl & Kimport, 2011).  
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The use of social media to mobilize may give the impression that social movement 
organizations are no longer needed. However, this is not the case. Social movement 
organizations are irreplaceable because they play an important role in mobilizing social 
movements (Earl & Kimport, 2011; Castells, 2015; Staggenborg & Ramos, 2016). Networked 
individuals and social movement organizations are not mutually exclusive in mobilization. 
Instead, they are interconnected and can accomplish a better result as a whole in social 
movements.   
 
Framing Theory and Transnational Advocacy Network Strategies 
        The way social movement actors frame issues in public discourses plays a central role in 
mobilizing social movements. Framing strategies do not only have an impact on the amount of 
exposure social movement issues are able to receive from mainstream mass media, but also 
influence audiences’ perspectives of these issues.  
       Framing is the process of social movement organizations “constructing and defining 
events for an audience through the control of agenda and vocabulary” (Rohlinger, 2002, p. 480; 
see also Goffman, 1974; Benford & Snow, 2000). When conducting this process, organizers 
simplify and condense aspects of life space in ways that can inspire and legitimate action of 
social movement organizations in order to perform interpretation of what is at issue (Snow & 
Benford, 1988; Benford & Snow, 2000; Rohlinger, 2002). In other words, by communicating 
action-oriented beliefs and meanings that guide action, frames are used “to mobilize potential 
adherents and constituents, to garner bystander support, and to demobilize antagnists” (Snow & 
Benford, 1988, p. 198; see also Benford & Snow, 2000). Movement organizers make use of 
frames in the movement to present audiences with core issues, pressure relevant parties to take 
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responsibility for problems, suggest possible solutions for problems, and motivate individuals to 
take action (Benford & Snow, 2000; Gamson, 1992).  
       In order to recruit potential participants to join in social movements, social movement 
organizations need to frame issues based on “frame alignment”, which is the connection between 
the ways individuals and social movement organizations interpret things (Snow, Rochford, 
Worden, & Benford, 1986). Snow and his colleagues (1986) suggested four types of frame 
alignment: frame bridging, frame amplification, frame extension, and frame transformation. 
They believed any of these processes is significant to the mobilization of social issues, and these 
four processes help achieve movement goals by interacting with each other.           
Frame bridging is the process that is employed by social movement organizations to align 
with individuals who share the same grievances and beliefs about certain issues but have a 
deficiency of organized strategies to pursue their goals (Snow et al., 1986). In order to effectuate 
this bridging, organizations disseminate their messages through interpersonal or intergroup 
networks, traditional technologies, such as the mass media, the telephone and the mail, and 
contemporary computer-based technologies (Snow et al., 1986).         
Frame amplification is the process of “the clarification and invigoration of an interpretive 
frame that bears on a particular issue, problem, or sets of events” (Snow et al., 1986, p. 469). 
This process is designed for organizations to promote values or beliefs that may not be salient or 
evident to potential adherents or to change indifferent and uncertain attitudes towards an issue 
(Snow et al., 1986). Frame amplification includes two varieties: value amplification and belief 
amplification (Snow et al., 1986). Values refer to the goals that social movements consider to be 
worthy of promotion and protection (Snow et al., 1986). One example of value amplification is 
embodied in the peace movement. In this movement, basic values such as justice, perseverance 
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and the sanctity of human life were frequently focused, while idealized values of the movement 
was associated with equality and liberty (Snow et al., 1986). In order to amplify these values, 
activists firmly stated their democratic rights to participate in the debate about the nuclear arms 
race, national security, and foreign policy (Snow et al., 1986). In terms of beliefs, they can be 
understood as ideas that support or hinder action that movements mobilize to pursue desired 
values (Snow et al., 1986). In order to accomplish movement goals, it is important to elevate and 
reinvigorate discourses on beliefs about how severe an issue or grievance is, the focus of a 
conflict, stereotypic beliefs about antagonists, beliefs about the efficacy of collective action, and 
beliefs about the necessity of taking action on the issue (Snow et al., 1986). One example of the 
amplification and transformation of stereotypic beliefs about antagonists can be found in the 
movement in which activists opposed the relocation plan of the Salvation Army shelter for 
homeless people (Snow et al., 1986). Activists transformed a stereotypically positive impression 
of the Salvation Army to a negative impression by amplifying and underlining the historical 
association of transients with the Salvation Army, thereby presenting them as a threat to 
neighborhoods. In terms of promoting beliefs about the efficacy of collective action, movement 
leaders in the peace movement frequently used the successes and achievement of past 
movements to encourage audiences to become optimistic about the outcome of the action (Snow 
et al., 1986).  
       Frame extension is the process in which social movement organizations extend existing 
interpretive frames for the purpose of encompassing interests or views that may not be embedded 
in extant social movement actors and enabling these values or beliefs to resonate with a broader 
public (Snow et al., 1986). By doing so, movement leaders attempt to enlarge the movement’s 
adherent base and attract potential supporters to mobilize (Snow et al., 1986). For instance, 
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movement leaders in the peace movement used rock-and-roll and punk bands in order to include 
interests that were not apparently related to the movement and to attract uninterested individuals 
to participate in protests (Snow et al., 1986).  
       Frame transformation is required when the values or beliefs promoted by social 
movement organizations may not relate to – or may even violate – the public’s interests or 
rituals. In this case, a transformation of frames is required. New values need to be exploited and 
conventional understandings need to be modified (Snow et al., 1986). Frame transformation is an 
important strategy for social movement organizations, such as Greenpeace, to mobilize 
transnational corporations by combining “morality and the market” in political consumerism 
(Smith, 1990; Holzer, 2010). By offering a framework that explains to consumers what public 
consequences are likely incurred by their individual consumption behaviors, activists can 
persuade consumers to change their shopping decision as a method to express their concern 
about social and environmental problems, which exerts moral pressure on corporations to alter 
their behaviour as their responsibility for nature and people (Holzer, 2010).   
In social movement studies, framing theory has been employed to focus on the analysis 
of text instead of images, and visual analysis has been mostly neglected by social science 
researchers (Daphi, Lê, & Ullrich, 2013). However, visual analysis provides social 
movement researchers and readers with insights into “framing processes and the dynamic of 
political diffusion inside and outside movements and in increasingly globalized yet 
culturally diverse societies” (Doerr, Mattoni, & Teune, 2013, p. xxii). Visual analysis also 
helps researchers understand how images offer social movement actors symbolic resources 
to evoke audiences’ resonance with the related movement discourses (Doerr et al., 2013).  
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Images are considered to be influential tools of mobilization, and occasionally, the 
power of images in subverting the sovereign control in a country and transforming political 
practices plays a key role in mobilizing protests (Doerr et al., 2013). Images are the 
products generated by the way protest actors perceive the issues mobilized in social 
movements, and these images will further influence how audiences understands the 
movements. Images also allow social movements to gain more visibility in the public. On 
one hand, the employment of a variety of images draws attention from a broader public 
today than in the past. On the other hand, offline activities mobilized by protestors are being 
seen more and more by audiences with the aid of social media today than in the past (Doerr 
et al., 2013). Online platforms, such as YouTube, offer activists relatively effortless ways to 
document protests and diffuse protest information through images, and therefore play an 
essential role in helping protestors circumventing the gatekeepers of mainstream mass 
media (Askanius, 2013).  
       Other than diffusing movement information, images, as well as texts, also have the 
capacity of recruiting potential adherents through mobilizing the individual’s emotion with 
moral leverage. The concept of morality, known as “moral shocks”, tends to occur when “an 
event or situation raises such a sense of outrage in people that they become inclined towards 
political action” (Jasper & Poulsen, 1995, P. 498). The transformation of emotion to action 
is the process in which a social movement bursts (Castells, 2015). In order to accomplish this 
transition, individuals need to overcome their anxiety and concern for protest action by 
expressing anger and outrage (Castells, 2015). As a result, this process will bring 
individuals hope to pursue their goals in mobilization (Castells, 2015). In other words, 
invoking protest actors’ outrage is critical to motivate social movements. As such, injustice 
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frames are employed by social movement organizations interpreting “what is happening” 
when “an authority system is violating the shared moral principles of the participants” in 
order to mobilize the outrage of social movement actors (Gamson, Fireman, & Rytina, 1982, 
p. 123). 
Activists sometimes create visual injustice symbols to generate moral shocks by 
providing photographic evidence of injustice connected to existing injustice frames in order 
to recruit concerned people to social movements (Jasper & Poulsen, 1995; Olesen, 2013). 
Images are able to act as “a public utterance” that arouses cultural and emotional resonance 
with audiences when they are associated with sets of meanings in the real world (Olesen, 
2013, p. 8). Moral shocks are commonly employed by social movement actors to resonate 
with audiences in transnational environmental movements (Holzer, 2010; Dauvergne & 
Neville, 2011). For instance, Greenpeace frequently uses emotional language and images in 
campaigns in order to convince people that some practices and choices are morally and 
environmentally wrong (Dauvergne & Neville, 2011).  
Framing is a prominent task in addressing transnational problems (Keck & Sikkink, 
1998; Holzer, 2010; Staggenborg & Ramos, 2016). In order to bring local or domestic issues to 
international attention, transnational advocacy networks employ the boomerang effect strategy to 
shape issues in transnational activism. “The boomerang effect” is used by transnational advocacy 
networks to help “amplify local demands by resituating them in different arenas with more 
potential allies” (Keck & Sikkink, 1998, p. 144). This “boomerang pattern of influence 
characteristic of transnational networks may occur” when communication channels between the 
nation and its domestic citizens are blocked or disrupted by the country’s sovereign power (Keck 
& Sikkink, 1998, p. 12). Activists in local movements in the Global South originally used this 
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strategy to attract the resources and political power from the Global North in order to exert 
international pressure on their domestic governments in the Global South (Keck & Sikkink, 
1998; Stoddart, Smith & Tindall, 2016). By doing do, transnational activists hoped to bring 
changes to local issues, mostly in less developed countries (Holzer, 2010). However, Stoddart 
and his colleagues argued that the boomerang effect no longer fits this model (Stoddart et al., 
2016). The boomerang effect is now also used by social movements in the Global North to single 
out and pressure governments in the Global North (Stoddart et al., 2016). This new mode was 
demonstrated in the COP 15 protests in which Canadian environmental movements used 
international arenas to generate pressure on the Canadian government for its poor performance 
on climate change (Stoddart et al., 2016).  
       As another strategy to shape transnational issues, social movement organizations often 
seek out the opportunity to cooperate with celebrities. Due to the limited access to resources and 
the cost of advertising, social movement organizations tend to turn to “free media” as the 
solution to their situation (Mccarthy & Zald, 1977). On one hand, celebrities are able to draw 
media attention to environmental causes and reach out to a broader audience with their symbolic 
authority as spokespeople (Gamson & Wolfsfeld, 1993; Meyer & Gamson, 1995; Brockington, 
2009; Ellcessor, 2018). As such, celebrities can help mobilize environmental movements by 
lending their fame to conservation objectives (Brockington, 2008). This encourages social 
movement organizations to create their opportunities with celebrities in order to ask them to 
advertise for movements (Rohlinger, 2002). However, how celebrities say about movements is a 
more important factor that affects social movement organizations to decide who are liable to 
cooperate with (Brockington, 2009). There are a few factors that can explain the prevalent 
tendency of celebrity activism: the mobilization of the United Nations, the promotion of Non-
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governmental organizations, the freedom given to celebrities to manage their own activities, and 
global issues keeping celebrities popular (Brockington, 2008; Tsaliki, Frangonikolopoulos, & 
Huliaras, 2011). Celebrities play an effective role in enhancing the public’s interests in global 
issues and can solicit a good amount of support from audiences (Tsaliki, Frangonikolopoulos, & 
Huliaras, 2011). On the other hand, some celebrities rely on their attitude or stance towards 
environmental issues to build their prestige (Brockington, 2008). In digital activism, celebrities’ 
social media accounts are seen as influential hubs communicating information and values to 
audiences (Ellcessor, 2018). However, celebrities are also confronted with challenges from social 
media platforms in online activism because these platforms can easily expose their personalities 
and make it possible for audiences to directly contact them (Ellcessor, 2012). Therefore, how 
celebrities decide to get involved in social movements on social media is directly related to 
whether or not they can achieve their fame and popularity.  
 
Offline and Online Activism: Opportunities or Challenges? 
Earl and Kimport (2011) categorized the web-related activism in the modern society into 
three different types based on their levels of leveraging of the affordances of the Internet: e-
movements, e-mobilization and e-tactics. E-movements are movements that “emerge and thrive 
online” and entirely unfold online (Earl & Kimport, 2011, p. 233). E-mobilizations are defined as 
the activism in which activists employ online tools to organize offline protest action (Earl & 
Kimport, 2011). E-tactics consist of a variety of protest action with different degrees of offline 
and online components where at least part of activists’ participation occurs online, such as online 
petitions, boycotts, and letter-writing campaigns (Earl & Kimport, 2011). As such, online 
activism does not only rely on the Internet and social media, but it is also intertwined with offline 
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activities. It is the combination of offline and online collective action that successfully creates 
social changes (Castells, 2015). 
Castells (2015) argued that it is necessary for social movements to exploit a public space 
which is “not limited to the Internet but makes itself visible in the places of social life” (p. 10). 
Offline occupied spaces create a community of togetherness that helps activists overcome fear 
and become dedicated to mobilizing social movements. By participating in offline activities, 
individuals “defy the bureaucratic norms of the use of space” and “trespass the boundaries set up 
by the dominant elites” (Castells, 2015, p. 10). Occupying offline spaces symbolizes “the power 
of invading sites of state power or financial institutions” in order to demand the rights of citizens 
that have been taken away by the political institutions (Castells, 2015, p. 10). In addition, offline 
activities can be crucial because they assist activists in the circulation and canvassing of 
campaign messages to isolated places that are beyond the reach of digital technologies (Castells, 
2015). Moreover, offline action helps social movements become successful because they can 
create visceral connections (Davis, 2011). Offline activists can meet in real groups and share 
their thoughts and ideas freely, which allows their passion to spread like a virus (Davis, 2011).  
Online action consists of a step on a ladder of engagement to promote offline engagement 
(Schumann & Klein, 2015). Online action may “foster subsequent—possibly more involving—
participation offline owing to an increased sense of empowerment or driven by accomplishment 
and action-oriented emotions” (Schumann & Klein, 2015, p. 310). In other words, individuals 
can develop confidence in their abilities of mobilizing when participating in collective action, 
which results in a growing sense of engagement and willingness to participate in future action 
(Drury & Reicher, 2005; Drury, Cocking, Beale, Hanson, & Rapley, 2005). In addition, the 
Internet and social media can be used as an instrument to increase transparency and 
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accountability in social movements (della Porta, 2013). For example, Distaso and Bortree (2012) 
argued that social media is considered to be a platform for open dialogues with publics that 
facilitate interaction and raise unexpected topics that help strengthen the relationship between 
organizations and audiences. Some scholars also illustrated the potential of the Internet for 
building trust and constructing collective identities online, which can be turned into mobilization 
and participation offline (Nip, 2004; Hara, 2008; Wojcieszak, 2009). Furthermore, social 
networks on the Internet provide activists with opportunities to communicate and amplify their 
offline experience, and to create autonomous spaces to debate and plan out their offline protest 
strategies (Castells, 2015).  
Both digital social networks and offline support communities are tools for self-reflection 
and a statement of people’s power (Castells, 2015). “The internet and wireless communication 
networks” and “the space of places of the occupied sites and of symbolic buildings targeted by 
protest action” constitute “the space of autonomy” which lies at the center of social movements 
(Castells, 2015, p. 250). Activists create this public space of autonomy to escape the authority of 
the state and mobilize contentious issues through self-management and solidarity, and this novel 
use of public space can attract mainstream mass media to report on issues and protest action 
(Castells, 2015).  
However, the mobilizing potential of the Internet and social media has also been called 
into question. Previous research showed that quick and easy online collective action, such as 
“liking” Facebook pages or signing online petitions, may foreclose meaningful engagement 
(Kristofferson, White, & Peloza, 2014). Because movement participants possibly feel that their 
online action already produce a positive influence on audiences, they are less willing to engage 
in further offline action for the same cause (Kristofferson et al., 2014). In addition, low-cost and 
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low-risk digital practices, known as clicktivism or slacktivism, are also considered to be in 
danger of being too fast, too thin and too many (Bromberg, 2013; Lim, 2013; Schumann & 
Klein, 2015). While many clicks may be witnessed online, they are just “little sticks”, which 
means that “there are very few causes that make for widespread activism in the vast online social 
media environment” (Lim, 2013, p. 653-654). In other words, individuals who simply engage in 
online action may not bring about measurable social changes.  
On the other hand, the proliferation of social media amplifies the challenges of 
surveillance and containment (Uldam, 2016). Social media provides governments and 
corporations with new possibilities to monitor social movements and censor dissent as a potential 
risk that menaces national security under control of governments or reputations of corporations 
(Bennett, 2003; Costanza-Chock, 2004; Curran, Fenton, & Freedman, 2012; Uldam, 2016). In 
order to accomplish law enforcement or other political purposes, governments supervise and 
acquire personal data through cooperating with private internet service providers and social 
media providers (DeNardis, 2014). In terms of corporations, they employ big data collected from 
social media to identify issues and events that can potentially harm their reputations, which helps 
corporations regain control of exposing their own activities (Andrejevic, 2014; Uldam, 2016). 
Corporations, such as Shell, often choose not to respond to critiques in order to potentially avoid 
getting into more trouble (Uldam, 2016). In addition, the strategy of silencing critics, such as 
taking down campaign websites in the name of maintaining brand reputation, is also adopted by 
corporations (Uldam, 2016). The surveillance and control of disagreement from governments 
and corporations largely hinders the potential of social media to mobilize counter-hegemonic 
discourses, which causes “unequal power relations that privilege government and corporate 
elites” (Uldam, 2016, p. 204; see also Curran et al., 2012).  
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Conclusion   
Recent literature on topics, such as digitally networked individualism, repertories of 
communication and on/off-line action, described important qualities of social media that are 
changing ways activists participate in social movements. Specifically, the literature on social 
movements and digital media examined how the proliferation of social media transforms the 
relationship of networked individuals and social movement organizations in social movements. 
This helps shape my research problem of who played a role as social movement actors to 
produce and respond to issues in the “Save the Arctic” campaign. In addition, the literature on 
framing theories and the concept of repertoires of communication helps guide my examination of 
media content in order to explore what protest messages were disseminated and how these 
messages were communicated to audiences through the use of social media in the movement. 
The framing analysis of my data provides insights into how protest strategies, such as the use of 
the boomerang effect and the tactics of on/off-line action, were shifting through social media 
activism in the movement. Moreover, previous literature helps me contribute insights into how 
different forms of communication were used to disseminate protest messages in the movement, 
especially the use of visual communication as part of social movement framing in digital forms 
of mobilization. Finally, previous literature helps me explain how social media intertwined with 
mass media in the “Save the Arctic” campaign.  
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Chapter Three: Research Methods 
      In this chapter, I provide an overview of the research methods for my study of how social 
actors mobilized the “Save the Arctic” campaign with the aid of social networking sites. I discuss 
qualitative web-based textual analysis as the approach that guided me to collect, generate and 
analyze my data. Specifically, I describe my sampling strategy, and explain why I chose Twitter 
as the platform for data collection and how I selected two critical events happening during the 
“Save the Arctic” campaign as prototypes to illustrate the way this environmental movement was 
organized and unfolded. I interpret Twitter content by using NVIVO to categorize the data into a 
variety of themes and to conduct matrices to explore the interconnections among themes.  
 
Research Design 
In order to examine how social media is employed by social movement actors to mobilize 
environmental movements, I conducted a qualitative case study by looking at how the “Save the 
Arctic” campaign was mobilized on Twitter. I chose to look at two critical events: the event of 
boycotting the Lego-Shell partnership and the event of “Free the Arctic 30”. These two critical 
events were selected because they received a large amount of response from social movement 
actors and involved a variety of movement tactics that are worth looking at. Some scholars 
argued that a case study is considered to be insufficient for perceiving social life as a whole 
(Hamel, Dufour & Fortin, 1993). This is because the scope of the study is only relevant to one 
case, and one case only provides readers with limited perception of social issues (Hamel et al., 
1993).  However, the case study is also considered to be an “in-depth investigation” because it 
employs different methods to collect a variety of information and make observations based on a 
great number of empirical materials. In addition, the scope of the case study includes “a review 
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of problems and considerations previously discussed regarding the representativeness of cases 
investigated” (Hamel et al., 1993, p. 35). Moreover, the case study is considered to be a crucial 
element in the process of expanding and generalizing theories (Hamel et al., 1993). Through 
conducting studies of a series of selected cases, researchers are able to generate and optimize a 
general explanation based on a set of results and apply it to enrich some theories (Hamel et al., 
1993). 
Due to the limitations of time and resources, I was not able to explore every moment of 
the “Save the Arctic” campaign. Therefore, I decided to use a purposive sampling strategy to 
select textual data for my research. A purposive sampling strategy is commonly used when 
researchers intend to gain in-depth insights into “a specific setting or phenomenon” (Sharp et al., 
2012, p. 38). Because of my research goals, using this method can guide me to find the best cases 
possible in order to understand the “Save the Arctic” campaign.  
My findings produced with the aid of the case study method and purposive sampling 
method may not be all applicable to explaining other environmental movements (Hamel et al., 
1993; Sharp et al., 2012). However, they can raise questions, contribute new perspectives on 
social movement theories, and create an opening for other researchers to continue further 
research in other social issues including environmental issues mobilized in the social media age.  
In terms of conducting my data collection and analysis, I adopted a qualitative research 
method of textual analysis to collect and analyze discourses related to Arctic oil drilling. I first 
employed a qualitative method of textual analysis to collect data from Twitter. Then, I organized 
my data by designing a coding scheme and coding the data into different themes in NVIVO. 
When I analyzed the data, I used NVIVO matrix queries to examine the in-depth meaning of 
each theme, and the correlation between different themes and emerging themes.  
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Data Collection Strategy 
I conducted my data collection by building up an archive of the Twitter content related to 
the “Save the Arctic” campaign including written text and visual materials generated by social 
movement actors through keyword and hashtag searching. The content from Twitter can be 
analyzed to provide readers with insights into how individuals and social groups used social 
media in response to Arctic oil conflict, and how social media discourses and strategies in the 
mobilization work in dialogue with counter-claims from movement opponents.  
       According to Fairclogh (2003), discourses consist of words and images through which 
people represent aspects of the processes, relations and structures of the material world, the 
mental world of thoughts, feelings, beliefs, and the social world. Since particular aspects of the 
world may be represented differently, it is necessary for us to consider the relationship between 
different discourses. Social media provides important platforms for people to spread their 
messages and communicate their thoughts. Texts and images on social media are different forms 
of discourses that people frequently use to present the world. Discourses can also be used for 
individuals and organizations to relate and interact with each other. Therefore, I examine not 
only different forms of discourses individually, but also their interaction and relationship. 
Fairclogh (2003) also argued that discourses do not only represent the world as it is, but it is also 
projective. This means that they are imagery, representing possible worlds which are different 
from the actual world, and are tied in to projects to change the world in particular directions 
(Fairclogh, 2003). Therefore, the role of social media in mobilizing the discussion on Arctic oil 
controversies can be examined through social media content analysis.  
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Sampling Discourse  
Among all the social media platforms, I decided to choose Twitter as the main source of 
my data collection. Twitter is one of the most popular social media technologies in the world 
(Marwick, 2013). As of the second quarter of 2018, monthly active users on Twitter averaged at 
335 million people (Number of monthly active Twitter users worldwide, n.d.). Twitter empowers 
social media users to disseminate their own messages and also to respond to the information 
shared by other audiences to an extensive degree (Tupper, 2014). Twitter allows for “instant 
postings of photos, on-the-ground reports, and quick replies to other users” due to the easy 
access of tweet information (Marwick, 2013, p. 94). The constraint of 140-character tweets 
requires users to create concise messages concisely and proficiently in order to adapt their 
language use to the microblogging service (Coesemans & De Cock, 2017). In other words, 
audiences need to make strategic use of Twitter in order to reach their targets effectively in a 
concise and quick manner. As such, examining Twitter content permits me to identify the online 
strategies that social movement actors used to mobilize Arctic oil conflict.  
Also, Twitter hashtags can help users track trending events which shows the main interest 
of the public or the issues which have been popularly discussed (Tupper, 2014). News agencies, 
politicians, activists and celebrities are the groups who employ Twitter more frequently in order 
to raise awareness of local and global issues, ideas and noteworthy news stories (Marwick, 2013; 
Tupper, 2014). In this case, Twitter is a useful source to explore and find the critical and popular 
events that receive response from a variety of sources in the “Save the Arctic” campaign.   
Moreover, Twitter has two main features: retweet and @reply. Retweeting can be 
understood both as a form of diffusing information and as a mean of engaging in a conversation 
                                                 
 The limit of characters for tweets was expanded on Nov. 7, 2017, but the data collection for my research had been 
completed before then. 
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(Boyd, Golder & Lotan, 2010). Users who spread tweets do not only intend to get messages out 
to new audiences, but also to validate and engage with others (Boyd et al., 2010). This implies 
that Twitter users will not find it worthwhile to share the content unless the original message is 
funny, clever and useful (Marwick, 2013). Coesemans and De Cock (2017) believed that the 
more a tweet post is retweeted by Twitter users, the more this post will be exposed in the public. 
This means these posts are more likely to be noticed and followed on Twitter (Coesemans & De 
Cock, 2017). In terms of @reply, it is a feature designed for Twitter users to draw attention to 
their messages from other users, such as people with plenty of followers. In the meantime, they 
also expect people who are tagged in their Twitter posts will respond to their messages 
(Marwick, 2013). By looking at these features of Twitter, I am able to exploit how social 
networking technologies transform the traditional mobilization of social issues by promoting the 
interaction of social actors.  
The “Save the Arctic” campaign rose in 2012 and the movement lasted for almost three 
years. Although the movement has subsided, there are still feelings of resentment in the 
community, and people are still expressing their concerns for the Arctic. There is a large amount 
of data about the theme of “Save the Arctic” since the campaign started. Given limited time and 
resources, however, the most feasible way to gather data for my study was to collect information 
about critical periods of mobilization by protest actors, which can help us understand the overall 
dynamics of the whole campaign. Thus, I decided to use a purposive sampling strategy to 
discover the most feasible sample size.  
Purposive sampling requires me to select data based on my professional knowledge or 
other scholars’ previous research, and it also allows me to adjust or change my samples at any 
time while I proceed with my research (Miles & Huberman, 1994; Suen, Huang & Lee, 2014).  
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Therefore, I first broadened the scope of potentially meaningful data by searching for various 
keywords or hashtags. These keywords or hashtags are “#savethearctic”, “Arctic Shell oil”, 
“Arctic oil drilling Greenpeace”, “#ShellNo”, “Arctic oilrigs”, “Arctic climate change”, “Arctic 
fossil fuels”, “offshore oil Shell”, and “Greenpeace Statoil”. Also, the feature of “Twitter 
Advanced Search” was used to limit the sampling frame. This was achieved by limiting the 
search results to English content only and created in the period of 2012 to 2015.  
Based on the search results, I then decided to specifically analyze two influential events 
to which campaigners responded very actively: the “Boycott the Lego-Shell Partnership” 
campaign and the “Free the Arctic 30” campaign. Critical events are what social movement 
actors frequently use to construct campaigns in order to draw public attention to targeted issues 
(Ramos, 2008). These two events are representative of the whole “Save the Arctic” campaign 
and worth being compared for several reasons. Both events unfolded internationally and received 
a large amount of response from international audiences. They involved a variety of protest 
tactics employed by social movement organizations and networked individuals. They shared 
similarities in the ideology of environmental movements led by Greenpeace, but also had 
difference showing how different strategies were highlighted under different circumstances. In 
terms of the differences between the two events, they had different targets against which they 
protested. The main targets of the “Boycott the Lego-Shell Partnership” campaign were the Lego 
and Shell corporations, but the main target of the “Free the Arctic 30” campaign was the Russian 
government. Also, the “Boycott the Lego-Shell partnership” campaign involved the interests of a 
broader public while the “Free the Arctic 30” campaign primarily targeted the political sphere of 
a few countries.  
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In order to fully examine these two campaigns, I pursued more information about the 
“Boycott the Lego-Shell Partnership” campaign by using the keywords and hashtag “Lego 
#savethearctic” to search for relevant tweets created from July 2014 to October 2014, and 
obtained more information about the “Free the Arctic 30” campaign by using the hashtag 
“#freethearctic30” to collect relevant data produced from September 2013 to November 2013. 
The periods of time which I gathered data from are also the time when the events mainly 
occurred. The corresponding Twitter content was captured and archived from Twitter in PDF 
format, and all the PDF documents were downloaded and imported into NVIVO qualitative data 
analysis computer software.  
Due to the large amount of content on the “Free the Arctic 30” campaign on Twitter, I 
decided to examine this event by sampling 10% of the total data that I collected. Specifically, I 
sampled this event by looking at every tenth tweets on the PDF documents. As a result, I 
analyzed 834 tweets for the “Boycott the Lego-Shell Partnership” campaign and 3,241 tweets for 
the “Free the Arctic 30” campaign. This sample was sufficient to reach data saturation. Data 
saturation occurs when “no new data or relevant information emerges with respect to newly 
constructed theory” (Saumure & Given, 2008, p. 196). By the end of coding this sample, the 
addition of new data and coding did not substantially change my coding categories (Tracy, 
2012).  
In addition to looking at the texts and visual content on Twitter, I also examined the links 
to mass media and social movement organization websites that were shared on Twitter. This 
helped in exploring how mass media and social movement organization websites were 
incorporated into social media platforms to help mobilize the campaign. The “Save the Arctic” 
campaign gained lots of attention and coverage from mass media, such as newspapers and 
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radio/TV stations, and Arctic oil drilling conflict was also discussed on organizational websites, 
including Greenpeace and World Wildlife Fund.  
 
Data Generation and Analysis  
In order to provide critical insights into the “Save the Arctic” campaign, Critical 
Discourse Analysis (CDA) was used to explore the texts produced and posted on this topic. The 
analysis method employs Fairclough’s three-dimensional model which involves analysis of the 
text, discursive practice and socio-cultural practice (Fairclough, 1993). Janks (1997, p. 329) 
provided more detailed explanation for these three dimensions. They include: 
1. the object of analysis (including verbal, visual or verbal and visual texts); 
2. the processes by which the object is produced and received (writing/speaking/designing 
and reading/listening/viewing) by human subjects; 
3. the socio-historical conditions that govern these processes. 
  Considering Janks’s summarization of Fairclough’s model, the first step of my analysis is 
to identify the themes in online discussion (Small & Harris, 2014). Ryan and Bernard (2003, p. 
85) argued that identifying themes involves several tasks:  
(1) discovering themes and subthemes, (2) winnowing themes to a manageable few (i.e., 
deciding which themes are important in any project), (3) building hierarchies of themes or code 
books, and (4) linking themes into theoretical models. 
Ryan and Bernard (2003) explained that themes do not come only from the data but also 
from the investigator’s prior theoretical understanding of the phenomenon being studied. 
Referring to the relevant research can provide readers with a clear understanding of the dynamic 
of environmental movements, and it also offers me an opportunity to tell readers what I can 
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contribute to the existing research. By following Ryan and Bernard’s process for content 
analysis, I first defined a preliminary coding scheme inspired by the literature review in order to 
outline and direct my coding structure. For example, I created nodes of “content producers (i.e. 
social movement organizations)” and “content targets” based on social movement theories. I 
created nodes of “text content themes” and “visual communication” respectively by referring to 
the research in visual analysis of social movements. I created nodes of “link sharing (of mass 
media and organizational websites)” because of the discussion in social movements literature 
about the relationship of mass media, organizational websites and social media. Then, I adopted 
a semi-structured method to complement my coding scheme, which offered me the opportunity 
to vary my coding scheme with emerging themes from my observation of the data. In order to 
best examine my research problems, I compared the coding themes with my research problems, 
selected or consolidated the most important and valuable codes, and eliminated those which are 
tangential to my research problems until no new significant themes emerged (Silverman & 
Marvasti, 2008). My final coding scheme (see Appendix One) has six leading nodes, and they 
encompass topics on content producers, movement targets, the themes of written and visual 
materials, link sharing strategies and social use of retweets. 
In terms of data analysis, I used NVIVO software to conduct qualitative textual analysis. 
An advantage of using the NVIVO program is this software enables the data to become more 
dynamic. This means that NVIVO makes relationships between categories more visible by using 
text formatting and hyperlinks to other documents and categories (Weaver & Atkinson, 1994).  I 
did manual coding for my data because this offered me the opportunity to interpret the data and 
make the decision on what to code. With the assistance of NVIVO, I did not only conduct an in-
depth analysis of every single node under each category to examine how discourses were 
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articulated in each campaign, but also used discourse network analysis to examine ties that 
connected the same node from one category to different nodes from other categories. A discourse 
network generates coding matrices in NVIVO that quantify thematic coding and provides the 
frequency of themes co-occurring in Web 2.0 content (Stoddart & Nezhadhossein, 2016). This 
approach highlights the role of network analysis as a significant supplement for a qualitative 
research design (Hesse-Biber, 2010). When I was conducting the visual discourse analysis2 of 
the “Boycott the Lego-Shell Partnership” campaign and “Free the Arctic 30” campaign, I 
particularly explored how diverse visual materials intertwine with “the mobilization, framing, 
diffusion, and resonance” of the campaigns (Doerr, Mattoni, & Teune, 2013, p. xii). 
Specifically, I addressed two aspects of research in the visual analysis of social movements: the 
visual expressions of social movements, such as visual symbols and activists’ visual 
appearances, and the visibility for social movements, such as the online diffusion of offline 
narrative (Doerr, Mattoni, & Teune, 2013).  
 
Methodological Reflexivity   
The qualitative textual analysis method is an unobtrusive method of observation for web 
content. The pragmatic benefit of this method is that Internet-based data collection is cost-free. 
Since Twitter content was available to the public and easy to access, I was able to acquire the 
relevant research information without spending time and money in traveling and did not feel 
concerned about confidentiality issues. These benefits offered me flexibility in conducting 
research (Macnamara, 2005). Another benefit of textual analysis was that it allowed me to work 
                                                 
2 Reader who have interest in looking at the visual culture of social movements can consult: Mirzoeff, N. 
(1998). The visual culture reader. London; New York: Routledge. 
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with data from a more extensive period than interactive-oriented methods. Hine (2005) argued 
that Internet research has connotations of topicality. In other words, discourses on the Internet 
provided me with updated information and kept me aware of the mobility of information. Thus, I 
was able to see the evolution of discourses through time and to identify popular discourses, 
which allowed me to gain a good understanding of a full-scale development of the “Save the 
Arctic” campaign.  
Textual data has the benefit of not being influenced by research context because it is not 
generated by researchers. However, the problem of inference is embedded in textual analysis 
(Cottle, 2003). This problem describes when analysts do not have data from either content 
producers or audience members who could shed more insights into the social dynamics of 
content production and reception, they have to make inferences about the intended meaning or 
audience reception of textual content simply based on the text itself. In other words, my 
interpretations of the data were considered in the analysis process. According to McKee (2003), 
the ways in which members of different cultures make sense of a text may vary based on the way 
in which they understand the world around them. This means that different people interpret texts 
from different angles. Therefore, I might not have an accurate grasp of all the information 
circulated by social movement organizations or networked individuals by simply using textual 
analysis techniques. However, I was well aware of the issue which might appear in the process of 
interpretation, so I ensured caution in making assertions about the information related to the 
“Save the Arctic” campaign. I also provided a context for the Twitter data I collected in order to 
improve the validity of my interpretations, which was necessary and significant (McKee, 2003). 
In terms of my case study of the “Save the Arctic” campaign, the content was understood and 
interpreted based on the context of Arctic oil conflict.  
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Conclusion  
In this chapter, I described the qualitative research method for my case study on how 
Twitter was employed by social movement organizations and networked individuals to mobilize 
the “Save the Arctic” campaign. I adopted a qualitative textual analysis of PDF files downloaded 
from Twitter to generate data. I discussed purposive sampling as the strategy directing me to 
select Twitter as my research location and to determine the events of “Boycott Lego-Shell 
Partnership” campaign and the “Free the Arctic 30” campaign as my research objects. I 
explained the coding steps as my data generation strategy. I also described the data analysis 
technique of using NVIVO qualitative computer software to gain insights into my samples by 
developing the matrices of discursive coding themes. Moreover, I justified the contribution of 
qualitative textual analysis and purposive sampling to my research project, but I also analyzed 
the limitations of both strategies.  
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Chapter Four: Research Results 
In this chapter, I explore how Twitter was used to mobilize both the “Boycott Lego-Shell 
Partnership” campaign and the “Free the Arctic 30” campaign. My results contribute in-depth 
insights into the new opportunities that social media, such as Twitter, offers activists to mobilize 
and the challenges that social media brings to protest culture. I first elaborate how Twitter 
influenced the relationship between social movement organizations and networked individuals in 
the campaigns. Then, I engage the concepts of frame alignment processes with the analysis of 
written and visual content on Twitter to explain what issues were targeted and how these targets 
were shaped by activists in the campaigns. I especially discuss what protest strategies, such as 
the boomerang effect, the celebrity effect and moral shocks, were employed by activists in the 
campaigns, and how these strategies were shifting through the use of Twitter. Finally, I examine 
the concept of repertories of communication and contribute to the understandings of how 
activists used Twitter to promote their protest strategies and messages in the context of 
multifaceted media environment.   
 
Critical Event One: the “Boycott Lego-Shell Partnership” Campaign 
The “Boycott the Lego-Shell Partnership” campaign was launched by Greenpeace 
globally in order to target Lego for prioritizing its commercial interests by cooperating with oil 
giant Shell and neglecting its responsibility to the environment and the impact of its commercial 
decision on children’s futures (Greenpeace Urges Lego, 2014). To address the potential threat to 
the unique wildlife living in the Arctic and global climate caused by Shell’s Arctic oil drilling 
plan, Greenpeace was dedicated to pressuring Lego, the biggest global toy company, to cease 
producing toys with oil giant Shell’s branding (Greenpeace Urges Lego, 2014). In the next 
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section, I explain how the elements of campaign activities were mobilized with the aid of Twitter 
in the “Boycott the Lego-Shell Partnership” campaign in order to contribute insights into how 
social media impacts the mobilization of environmental issues.  
 
Social Movement Actors 
In this section, I examine who played a role in mobilizing the “Boycott the Lego-Shell 
Partnership” campaign.  
As shown in my data, Twitter content was created by both individual and organizational 
accounts. Individual accounts were registered by users with their individual identities, through 
which users produced campaign-related content as individual participants. Organizational 
accounts were created by Greenpeace or other groups in order to convey information or opinions 
which represented the interests of a group of people. Individual accounts generated 78.02% of 
the total campaign-related content on Twitter, while organizational accounts produced 21.98% of 
the total content on Twitter.  
Despite the fact that individual participants created a larger amount of campaign-related 
content, organizations still played an important role in mobilizing around the issue of the Lego-
Shell partnership. This finding was explored by looking at the number of retweets. Retweeting is 
used by Twitter users to disseminate information and participate in a conversation (Boyd, Golder 
& Lotan, 2010). Twitter users are more likely to diffuse and reinforce tweets produced by other 
people when they find these tweets impressive and worth spreading (Marwick, 2013). Activists 
repost campaign-related information in the hope of increasing the exposure of the information 
and enabling the messages to reach out to a broader public (Coesemans & De Cock, 2017). As 
such, the number of retweets is able to show what types of messages resonate with campaign 
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participants and other Twitter audiences. My data shows that tweets created by organizations had 
substantially more retweets than content produced by individual participants in general, and 
organizations were also at an advantage in terms of the average number of retweets that every 
tweet received. As such, the data indicates that organizational messages resonated much more 
frequently with Twitter audiences than individual messages. According to previous research, 
organizations are considered to be able to bring movement participants a good degree of 
commitment and trust in mobilization (Earl & Kimport, 2011; Mercea, 2012). Therefore, in the 
“Boycott the Lego-Shell Partnership” campaign, organizations had more mobilizing capacity 
than individual participants. 
This mobilizing capacity of movement organizations is embodied in creating protest 
opportunities for movement participants and using institutionalized tactics, as also suggested in 
previous research (Klandermans, 2004; Earl & Kimport, 2011; Staggenborg & Ramos, 2016). 
This finding can be seen by examining the content of organizational tweets that were retweeted 
in the “Boycott the Lego-Shell Partnership” campaign. The retweets present two themes that 
were commonly seen in my data. On one hand, social movement organizations encouraged 
supporters to pressure Lego to end its partnership with Shell. For example, Greenpeace Bristol 
tweeted, “@Harbourfest Meet us at the Harbour Festival 19th-20th of July, Bristol Harbourside 
and help stop Lego working with Shell #SaveTheArctic.” Another example was tweeted by 
Greenpeace: “Love LEGO, hate Arctic drilling? Sign and RT >>> grnpc.org/Ig0I0 #BlockShell 
#SaveTheArctic.” On the other hand, the images of Lego toys were used to protest against Shell. 
For instance, Greenpeace USA tweeted, “The #LEGO gang delivered a clear message to 
@Lego_Group today to #BlockShell & #SaveTheArctic.” In order to pressure Lego to end its 
partnership with Shell, social movement organizations used the images of protesting Lego toys in 
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the name of “Lego protestors” or “Lego protest” to draw Lego’s attention to the conflict and also 
to express their grievances about Lego’s partnership with Shell.  
Commonly retweeted content also includes points when environmental organizations 
created online petition websites for activists and encouraged them to sign the petition, and also 
coordinated offline action, such as physical gatherings and meetings. In addition, organizations 
devised a strategy to pressure Lego to stop its partnership with Shell by using the images of Lego 
toys, such as when activists wore Lego toy costumes or created virtual protests made of Lego 
toys on Twitter. As such, movement organizations did not only offer both online and offline 
protest opportunities, but also used certain online protest strategies and provided audiences with 
information about protest progress shared by their professional staff.  
Despite the leading role of organizations, individual participants who were connected 
through digital social networks made it possible for the campaign-related information to widely 
proliferate and diversify. Twitter, as one of the commonly used social media platforms, informs 
audiences of the issue of the Lego-Shell partnership and the progress of the campaign 
internationally, and also helps coordinate widely-dispersed individuals from different locations 
to engage in the campaign (Earl & Kimport, 2011; Rainie & Wellman, 2012; Browning, 2013). 
As shown in my data, individual activists shared supportive information in different languages, 
such as English, Spanish, French, and offline protest activities were organized in different 
regions and countries. By using Twitter, individual participants proliferated campaign-related 
information and disseminated it to a broader audience in various parts of the world. 
In addition, Twitter offered international audiences autonomy and communication power 
to engage in the discussion of the issue of the Lego-Shell partnership and become their own 
broadcasters (Castells, 2015). The autonomy of these voices enabled individual participants to 
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contribute different protest strategies and information to the mobilization. As can be seen in my 
data, individual participants showed their own protest activities on Twitter. For instance, 
individuals tweeted to show their participation in online petitions or tweeted photos of their own 
written protest messages. However, this participation with individual features was not produced 
by movement organizations. As such, individual participation increased the diversity of the 
discussion of the Lego-Shell partnership issue.  
Based on the findings that I have discussed above, an evolving relationship of social 
movement organizations and networked individual participants in the era of social media can be 
seen in the “Boycott the Lego-Shell Partnership” campaign. Different from previous research 
focusing on leaderless participation and dependence on digitally networked individuals (Earl & 
Schussman, 2003; Benkler, 2006; Shirky, 2008; Earl & Kimport, 2011; Castells, 2015), my 
findings suggest that digitally networked individuals do not replace social movement 
organizations. Social media has improved the mobilizing ability of individuals, but this does not 
deny the importance of social movement organizations in social movements. Instead, social 
media enables social movement organizations and digitally networked individuals to become 
interconnected and coordinated in mobilization to enlarge the scope of movements and enrich 
movement information.  
However, the problem of authenticity in the role of networked individuals in producing 
and circulating campaign-related information is also embedded in my findings. Previous research 
showed the possibility of astroturfing activities involved in social movements in which artificial 
or fake activists are sponsored or created by corporations and governments to manipulate 
movement discourses (Cho et al., 2011; Greenberg, Knight, & Westersund, 2011; Wear, 2014). 
In my data, some individual protest activities were likely generated by astroturfing organizations 
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who constituted a third group in addition to social movement organizations and digitally 
networked individuals. In other words, astroturfing activities possibly challenged the role of 
networked individuals in mobilizing around the Lego-Shell partnership issue. Nevertheless, it is 
difficult and beyond my abilities to assess or evaluate which users were or were not manipulated 
by astroturfing organizations.  
In addition to the findings of a changing relationship of social movement organizations 
and digitally networked individuals, my data also shows an evolving relationship of the leading 
social movement organization and other groups in a movement. In terms of the Twitter content 
generated by organizations, 90.91% of the content was created by Greenpeace organizations 
while 9.09% of the content was produced by other groups. 
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Greenpeace Organizations Other Groups 
Greenpeace Greenpeace Pix Mint Press News 
Arctic Sunrise Greenpeace Japan Local Auckland 
Greenpeace UK Greenpeace USA the Public Society 
Greenpeace Canada Greenpeace Huddersfield March for Elephant 
Greenpeace Newcastle Greenpeace New Zealand Team4Nature UK 
Greenpeace Bristol Greenpeace East Asia Clean Ocean Energy 
Greenpeace Aus Pac Greenpeace Cherbourg Wilderness Committee 
Greenpeace Pictures Greenpeace Edinburgh Mid Island News 
Save the Arctic Greenpeace Southwark Climate Issues 
Greenpeace St. Olaf Greenpeace Camden Alaska Wilderness League 
Greenpeace Oxford Greenpeace UK Oceans Protect All Wildlife 
Greenpeace Shoreditch Greenpeace Nottingham Lucy Lawless Fan Club Team 
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Table 1         Organizational Accounts in the “Boycott the Lego-Shell Partnership” Campaign 
 
As shown in Table 1, the “Boycott the Lego-Shell Partnership” campaign received a wide 
range of responses from social movement organizations across the globe. Organizations in this 
campaign produced tweets in three common topics: encouraging audiences to protest, asking 
Lego to end their business with Shell, and informing the audience of ongoing online and offline 
action. The campaign-related content that different groups produced on Twitter appeared 
consistent. In other words, organizations seemed to have similar interest in circulating campaign-
related information on Twitter.  
As shown in my data, Greenpeace played a leading role in the mobilization and 
contributed the majority of the Twitter content discussing the issues of Lego’s partnership with 
Shell. However, other organizations also played a part in mobilizing protest activities and 
provided support to the campaign. As such, Greenpeace organizations including the head office 
and regional branches worked in solidary with other organizations. This finding implies that the 
mobilization of issues related to Arctic oil drilling relied on the coordination of multiple groups 
rather than a single organization.  
In addition, my data shows that regional Greenpeace groups, such as Greenpeace UK, 
Greenpeace USA, and Greenpeace Aus Pac, were the main constituents of social movement 
organizations in this campaign. Regional groups did not only organize activities in local 
Greenpeace Southwest London Greenpeace Philippines Nature for Life Conservation Initiative 
Greenpeace Waltham Forest   
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communities, but also used supportive slogans in local citizens’ native languages. Because the 
impact of oil exploitation on climate change and human life had become a concern of global 
citizens (Wright, 2014), the “Boycott the Lego-Shell Partnership” campaign against Arctic oil 
drilling was internationalized and localized. As such, the mobilization around issues related to 
Arctic oil drilling relied on a coalition of many regional branches rather than any head office.  
These findings demonstrate the idea of “mesomobilization” discussed in previous 
research, arguing that social movement organizations have the capacity to mobilize other 
organizations and the goal is to achieve a greater scale of action (Gerhards & Rucht, 1992; Earl 
& Kimport, 2011). Twitter provided opportunities for Greenpeace and other social movement 
organizations, such as Team4Nature UK and Nature for Life Conservation Initiative, to easily 
connect and scale up the campaign through their connections (Bennett, 2003a, 2003b, 2004a, 
2004b; Earl & Kimport, 2011). The quantity of movement organizations is helpful to 
mobilization. However, organizational abilities of resonating with activists with various cultural 
backgrounds cannot be neglected as well. It is suggested that scientific and moral frames of 
environmental issues resonate differently with audiences due to changing cultural and media 
contexts (Dauvergne & Neville, 2011). In other words, the same campaign-related discourses 
may be perceived differently by different audiences based on their cultural backgrounds. In order 
to recruit citizens across the globe to participate in the “Boycott the Lego-Shell Partnership” 
campaign, Greenpeace attempted to mobilize many regional groups to connect to local citizens 
by communicating with local citizens in their native languages and organizing offline activities 
in local communities for people to gain a better understanding of the campaign. Therefore, my 
findings suggest that the “mesomobilization” of social movement organizations is not only about 
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the scope of coalition of different organizations, but also about the ability to respond to various 
cultural contexts in which individual activists are embedded.  
 
Campaign Targets 
In this section, I discuss who were framed as the targets of the “Boycott the Lego-Shell 
Partnership” mobilization on Twitter. Then, I use framing theories to examine how the issue was 
interpreted on Twitter. 
As suggested in existing literature on framing theories, social movement organizations 
employ frames to help audiences understand issues they are experiencing (Goffman, 1974; 
Luhtakallio, 2013). By doing so, social movement organizations are able to present audiences 
with core issues, pressure relevant parties to take the responsibility to address the problems, 
suggest possible solutions for the problems, and recruit people to participate in collective action 
(Gamson, 1992; Benford & Snow, 2000). Therefore, it is necessary to conduct framing analysis 
of the written and visual content circulated by social movement organizations on Twitter in order 
to perceive what issue was targeted in the “Boycott the Lego-Shell Partnership” campaign and 
how social movement organizations mobilized supporters to take action on the issue. 
Specifically, I use the concept of frame alignment processes to explain how social movement 
organizations associated their interpretation of the issue with activists through Twitter (Snow et 
al., 1986).   
Within all the Twitter content I gathered that can be identified with a target, 52.22% of 
the content targeted Lego and 47.04% of the content targeted Shell. Lego and Shell were usually 
targeted at the same time by activists in the campaign. In terms of the Twitter content targeting 
Lego and Shell, directly calling for a termination of Lego and Shell’s cooperation was the most 
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commonly shared content on Twitter, which constituted 23.63% of the total content that I 
analyzed. Asking movement participants to take online and offline action to pressure Lego to 
stop its partnership with Shell was also a common theme, which accounted for 21.98% of the 
total tweets. Another noticeable theme was the visual use of Lego mini figures for protest, which 
represented 13.19% of the total tweets. Apart from these common themes, the following tweets 
were also frequently seen in my data: showing protest activities of individual participants against 
Lego’s partnership with Shell in offline settings, presenting a large number of people engaging in 
online action, expressing grievances towards Lego’s partnership with Shell, highlighting that 
Lego matters to children, accusing Shell and Lego of polluting kids’ imagination, boycotting oil 
giants like Shell for their harmful pollution of the Arctic, complimenting and thanking Lego for 
stopping their partnership with Shell, showing protest action against the Lego-Shell partnership 
from celebrities, complimenting and thanking individual activists for taking action, and showing 
Lego ending its partnership with Shell.  
In terms of the visual content on Twitter that I analyzed, the commonly circulated 
pictures showed Lego mini figures protesting against Shell, Lego mini figures celebrating the 
victory of the campaign, and posters of Lego toys and supportive words. Other widespread 
images presented children participating in campaign activities, supporters holding propaganda 
posters in offline protests, activists wearing Lego costumes, polar bears walking on the broken 
ice, intimate polar bears hugging each other, and scenes of oil spills. In addition, Lego: 
Everything is Not Awesome and Lego, Help Children Save the Arctic were the mostly circulated 
videos, which respectively constituted 42.31% of the total videos shared on Twitter by social 
movement organizations. Another video circulated by social movement organizations showed 50 
kids building a toy polar bear with giant Lego bricks in front of Shell’s office.  
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By analyzing the written and visual data, many tweets motivated audiences to engage in 
online or offline action or both types of activities. For example, Greenpeace wrote on July 16, 
2014, “SIGN if you love @LEGO_Group and want to #blockShell from Arctic drilling. 
grnpc.org/Ig0Aw #SaveTheArctic.” In this tweet, Greenpeace encouraged movement 
participants to sign the online petition that was created by Greenpeace in order to pressure Lego 
to end its partnership with Shell. Another example of using online action to recruit potential 
supporters was created by Greenpeace UK, stating: “We've hit 1 MILLION people asking 
@LEGO_Group to dump Shell & #SaveTheArctic.” In this tweet, Greenpeace UK used numbers 
to show the great progress that the online campaign had achieved as of September 22, 2014, 
which could bring activists a sense of accomplishment. In terms of attracting potential supporters 
to engage in offline activities, Greenpeace Bristol tweeted on July 11, 2014, “@Harbourfest 
Meet us at the Harbour Festival 19th-20th of July, Bristol Harbourside and help stop Lego 
working with Shell #SaveTheArctic.” In this tweet, Greenpeace Bristol attempted to use Twitter 
to organize offline activities for activists. As shown in the data, Greenpeace and other groups 
provided protest opportunities on Twitter to individual activists to participate in.  
This strategy can be explained using the idea of frame bridging process, in which social 
movement organizations attempt to recruit potential movement adherents by reaching out to 
these individuals through traditional or new media technologies (Snow et al., 1986). In the 
“Boycott the Lego-Shell Partnership” campaign, movement organizations mobilized both online 
and offline protest activities that were available and easily accessible on Twitter, and this 
provided options for movement adherents to participate in the campaign. In addition, the analysis 
of retweeting in the last section shows that movement participants frequently resonated with the 
framing of online and offline action. These findings indicate that the use of Twitter in mobilizing 
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activists is a crucial form of frame bridging alignment (Snow et al., 1986), and it is an useful and 
effective strategy for movement organizations to use to recruit potential participants. In other 
words, Twitter served as an important platform to recruit potential movement supporters in the 
“Boycott the Lego-Shell Partnership” campaign. 
These findings also show that activists rely on both online and offline action in order to 
make social changes (Castells, 2015). In this campaign, online action consists of a stepping stone 
to promote offline engagement (Schumann & Klein, 2015). This is perhaps attributed to the 
mobilizing abilities of online action. Low-threshold online participation creates autonomous 
space for protestors to plan out their offline protest strategies (Castells, 2015). Online action can 
also create a sense of empowerment and accomplishment and help activists construct collective 
identities (Nip, 2004; Drury et al., 2005; Hara, 2008; Wojcieszak, 2009; Schumann & Klein, 
2015). These action-oriented emotions can foster subsequent offline action (Schumann & Klein, 
2015).  
In order to inspire and facilitate individuals to engage in the campaign, Greenpeace and 
other organizations further explained and optimized their frames, which is known as frame 
amplification alignment (Snow et al., 1986). Illustrating the focus of contention is one of the core 
tasks in frame amplification process (Snow et al., 1986). In this campaign, the focus of the 
conflict was the Lego’s partnership with Shell.  
As another task in frame amplification process, social movement organizations widely 
expressed grievances in order to show the Lego-Shell partnership was seriously opposed and the 
campaign was given great importance by activists (Snow et al., 1986). For example, Save The 
Arctic @savethearctic posted on Aug. 27, 2014, “As a huge #LEGO fan, I'm outraged you're 
helping #Shell clean up its image for dirty oil drilling #SaveLego #savethearctic.” Save the 
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Arctic group used the word “outraged” to show their grievances and objection to the Lego and 
Shell’s partnership.  
In order to explain why it was necessary to take action on the issue (Snow et al., 1986), 
social movement organizations clarified that the Arctic environment was valuable and worthy of 
protection. They emphasized the potential threats of Shell’s oil drilling plan to the Arctic’s 
ecosystem and global climate, as well as negative impacts on the future of children caused by 
Lego. Specifically, social movement organizations diffused images depicting striking 
consequences of oil exploitation, such as melting ice, a polar bear’s lonely walking on broken 
and isolated ice, and a bird soaked in spilled oil, to indicate the potential threat of Shell’s oil 
drilling plan in the Arctic.  
My data shows that the use of polar bear images was one of the main strategies for 
Greenpeace to mobilize their campaign. This is because that polar bears are considered to be 
endangered species by many environmental organizations that need to be saved (Martinez, 
2014). Polar bears have been seen as the representative of the icy and snowy Arctic and also 
become an emotional symbol arousing individuals’ sympathy for the melting Arctic which 
suffers from climate change (Slocum, 2004). Another reason elaborated by social movement 
organizations for audiences to take action is that Lego’s support to Shell set a bad example in 
protecting the environment for children who are their main consumers. For instance, Save the 
Arctic @savethearctic wrote: “If LEGO cares about children's future, dump the oil company that 
destroys it #SaveLego #SaveTheArctic grnpc.org/gotweet” and “@LEGO_Group don't let 
@Shell pollute our children's minds! #BlockShell and #SaveTheArctic.” In these tweets, Save 
the Arctic indicated that Shell’s oil drilling plan can produce pollution, and this negative impact 
on its customers’ children would be brought by Lego cooperating with Shell.  
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Moreover, social movement organizations attempted to gain visibility for the campaign 
by extensively using images of protest scenes consisting of Lego toys. An example of an online 
action was that activists widely circulated pictures showing protest activities using Lego mini 
figures. In terms of offline action, Greenpeace USA posted “Just a life-size #LEGO dropping 
some knowledge on how @Lego_Group could #SavetheArctic from #Shell” and attached a 
photo of an offline protest scene. Previous research argued that activists often become 
marginalized because images that protestors use to articulate their goals are not familiar, 
expected or compatible with the general public’s experience (Doerr et al., 2013). In other words, 
in order to become better engaged in the movement, activists should circulate images that convey 
messages familiar and relevant to audiences’ experience. In the campaign, the images of Lego 
toys can resonate with audiences through their nostalgic feelings towards Lego, and the goal of 
protecting the Arctic from oil drilling communicated from the images was not strange to 
audiences as well. Thus, organizations circulated the images of Lego toys in order to bring public 
attention to the campaign.  
In the process of frame amplification, social movement organizations disseminated a 
variety of visual materials. Previous research showed that visual materials play a significant role 
in framing social issues and mobilizing (Doerr et al., 2013). They offer opportunities for social 
movement actors to draw public attention to certain issues with striking pictures or sound-bites 
(Doerr et al., 2013). However, activists can experience a difficult time presenting some 
environmental issues in the media because they are “geographically distant or dispersed, 
multinational or international, have a slow onset, are invisible, and are technically complex” 
(Doyle, 2003, p. 128; see also Yearley, 1991; Beck, 1992; Medler & Medler, 1993; Hannigan, 
1995). The process of the formation of environmental issues, such as climate change, that were 
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potentially impacted by Shell’s Arctic oil drilling plan involved complex causes and long-term 
processes, which made it difficult for social movement organizations to visually present the 
issues (Doyle, 2003).  
In the “Boycott the Lego-Shell Partnership” campaign, archived images, such as polar 
bears walking on broken ice and polar bears clinging to the edge of isolated ice, were used as 
short-term elements to represent long-term processes of climate change. The pictures that simply 
showed individual consequences of oil drilling were actually used as symbols or metaphors to 
indicate and represent a bigger and more complex environmental issue (Goodnow, 2006). In 
other words, the use of images helped activists circulate complex issues through simple forms of 
expression. In addition, the mobilizing abilities of these images were powerful (Doerr et al., 
2013). The content of these images can produce moral shocks that enabled audiences to affiliate 
themselves with other activists who had similar identities (Jasper & Poulsen, 1995; Doerr et al., 
2013). In other words, individual and short-term elements were able to draw public attention to a 
long-term and complex issue because they had the ability to arouse moral shocks. Moral shocks 
also played a critical role in invoking protestors’ outrage, and expressing anger and outrage was 
the key to helping activists overcome anxiety and gain hope for mobilization (Castells, 2015). In 
addition, governments or corporations as the villains in the conflict may only be able to be 
depicted as faceless and abstract entities (Doyle, 2003). For example, in order to visualize Lego 
and Shell corporations in protest messages on Twitter, social movement organizations widely 
used images of Lego toys to represent Lego and the Shell logo to refer to Shell.  
One noticeable framing strategy that social movement organizations used to mobilize 
movement participants was to leverage the influence of children. The frame analysis shows that 
the “Boycott the Lego-Shell partnership” campaign intended to rely on Lego’s consumers to put 
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pressure on Lego because consumers have the ability to influence corporate decision making 
(Holzer, 2010). In the campaign, social movement organizations framed children as victims of 
the Lego and Shell’s partnership. For example, Greenpeace Aus Pac @GreenpeaceAP wrote, 
“@LEGO_Group don't let @Shell pollute our children's minds! #BlockShell and 
#SaveTheArctic at grnpc.org/Ig0re.” Save The Arctic @savethearctic tweeted, “@ioedge If 
LEGO cares about children's future, dump the oil company that destroys it #SaveLego 
#SaveTheArctic grnpc.org/gotweet.” As can be seen from these tweets, children were seen as a 
moral restraint to Lego, and Lego was faced with moral accusations in terms of their 
responsibility for children. In other words, Lego was essentially blamed by social movement 
organizations for acting untrustworthy and irresponsible to children who were their main 
consumer group because their decision of cooperating with Shell was considered to have an 
adverse impact on children’s future.  
It seems that social movement organizations attempted to achieve two goals by framing 
children on Twitter. On one hand, social movement organizations hoped to leverage close ties of 
children to parents as a transformation of protest frames to better resonate with activists, if the 
frame of protecting the Arctic’s environment turned out to be distant from the public’s interests 
(Holzer, 2010). This idea was suggested by the concept of frame transformation alignment, 
which requires organizations to explore new values when old values or beliefs cannot resonate 
with movement participants (Snow et al., 1986). Children were the main target consumers of 
Lego, but their parents were the actual ones who had power of consumption to purchase Lego 
products and they were also the potential protestors that social movement organizations intended 
to recruit to the campaign. Therefore, the frequent use of the word “our children” in the tweets 
shows that social movement organizations attempted to reach out to parents and to translate their 
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purchasing acts into negative impacts on their children (Holzer, 2010). By doing so, movement 
organizations intended to transform parents’ shopping decisions as a critical means to pressure 
Lego (Holzer, 2010). In other words, movement organizations tried to assemble individual 
powers of resistance by mobilizing protestors’ emotion and turning it into a collective purchasing 
power to exert pressure on Lego. 
 On the other hand, social movement organizations attempted to provoke Lego to feel 
guilty by shaping the corporation as the campaign’s potential ally on Twitter. For example, Save 
the Arctic group tweeted, “I loved #LEGO till I heard about its partnership with Arctic destroyer 
#Shell. Dump Shell to #SaveLego and #SaveTheArctic.” Greenpeace Notts tweeted, 
“#PaganPrideUK loves @LEGO_Group but wants them to #BlockShell and #SaveTheArctic 
@GreenpeaceNotts.” In these tweets, Shell was shaped as the centre of disastrous influence on 
the Arctic and global climate, while Lego was perceived as a potential ally that social movement 
organizations can cooperate with to protest against the oil giant Shell. Along with 
disappointment and grievances, activists also expressed their support and love for Lego in order 
to encourage Lego to forgo the partnership. Moral leverage was employed by social movement 
organizations to criticize Lego for harming children’s innocence and violating the public’s moral 
values. In order to persuade Lego to abandon its business cooperation with Shell, social 
movement organizations intended to place Lego in a moral dilemma by framing its loyal 
consumers as the victims of its partnership with Shell and presenting the ambivalence of 
disappointment and support from customers.  
In addition to Lego and Shell, Greenpeace and their protest strategies were also targeted 
by individuals during the campaign. These tweets presented criticism of the Greenpeace 
campaign. For example, A S H L Y N @etcshlynbin tweeted, “@GreenpeaceUK i really want 
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@LEGO_Group to drop @Shell branding too, but your campaigners are too pushy. 
#SaveTheArctic.” Despite many movement supporters engaging in protest activities on the 
Internet and social media or in offline communities, some people did not fully support 
Greenpeace’s protest action. Also, online tactics allowed by social networking technologies were 
called in question for their effectiveness. For instance, John Sutton @HGJohn tweeted, “This 
clicktavist victory to get Shell logos oﬀ Lego toys will have zero impact. It won't 
#SaveTheArctic Stop driving instead, that might.” It did not seem that these low-cost and fast 
online tactics were considered to be optimal and efficient by all audience members (Bromberg, 
2013; Lim, 2013; Schumann & Klein, 2015). 
As shown in my data, the mobilizing capacity around the Lego-Shell partnership issue 
was endorsed by a great number of people, but not every person was convinced by Greenpeace’s 
campaign approaches and strategies. This finding suggests that the proliferation of social media 
did not only promote opportunities for self-representation, but this tendency also amplified the 
challenges to the role of online action (Uldam, 2016). While social media promoted autonomous 
engagement of individuals in supporting mobilization, they also allowed antagonistic voices to 
proliferate and become more noticeable.   
Another challenge in social media use was surveillance and containment. In this 
campaign, YouTube was targeted for censoring and blocking Greenpeace’s video Lego: 
Everything is not Awesome. This video was silenced perhaps because the Greenpeace’s video 
conveyed dissent towards the oil industry that was seen as a potential risk to corporations’ 
reputations (Bennett, 2003; Costanza-Chock, 2004; Curran et al., 2012; Uldam, 2016). However, 
the actual reason why this video was taken down could not be found based on my data. Based on 
my key word search, my data simply shows one side of opinions from movement supporters but 
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lacks insights into standpoints of Shell and Lego as targeted corporations. This could be a 
strategy that corporations used to protect their reputations, as suggested in previous research 
(Uldam, 2016). By choosing not to respond to critiques on Twitter, Lego and Shell intended to 
avoid potentially falling into more troubles (Uldam, 2016). As such, social movement actors 
were also confronted with challenges from the surveillance of corporations and governments 
allowed by social media.  
 
Social Use of Twitter  
In this section, I analyze how activists used Twitter to interact with other platforms in 
order to enrich and promote campaign-related messages by looking at the tactic of link sharing 
on Twitter.  
Link sharing to third party websites on Twitter can be commonly seen during the 
campaign, and it was widely used to increase the circulation of campaign-related information. In 
terms of the Twitter content with links shared to online activities, online petition websites 
accounted for 38.77% of the total tweets with links attached, and links to online donation 
websites constituted 8.75% of the total tweets. These websites were frequently shared when 
social movement actors directly asked Lego to stop their partnership with Shell, and online 
petitions were significant resources for activists to use to protest online.  
Content that had links to other social media platforms accounted for 20.68% of the total 
content with links attached. Specifically, links to YouTube accounted for 60.58% of the total 
links to social media, links to Vimeo represented 14.42% of the total links, and links to 
Facebook, Instagram and other tweets on Twitter constituted 4.81% of the total links 
respectively. Other links to Flickr and Tumblr can be seen on Twitter as well.  
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As can be seen from my data, YouTube was the most commonly seen platform compared 
to other social media platforms. Tweets directing users to YouTube usually focused on three 
themes. The first one was compliment Greenpeace’s campaign or campaign video Lego: 
Everything is Not Awesome. For instance, Tracy Van Slyke @tracyvs wrote on Aug 8, 2014, 
“Great @Greenpeace #lego video ties together culture and campaigns. bit.ly/1ojjZYX 
#SaveTheArctic.” This tweet was written in order to use the video to draw public attention on the 
campaign. The second theme was expressing grievances about the Lego’s partnership with Shell. 
For example, Bernie Thornton @bernieT36 posted on July 9, 2014, “WATCH this video to see 
how @Shell is selling propaganda to kids. Shame on you @Lego_Group bit.ly/1j8Moiz 
#savethearctic #BlockShell.” This user showed criticism to Lego and Shell and intended to use 
the video Lego: Everything is Not Awesome to support his opinion. The third theme was asking 
Lego to forgo its partnership with Shell. For example, Blanca Figuerola @BlancaFiguerola 
wrote, “Join our movement to #savethearctic by telling @LEGO_Group to cut its ties with 
#Shell! See video: xurl.es/ecuay”. It seems that the video Lego: Everything is Not Awesome was 
shared to support and explain her proposal for protest action against the Lego and Shell’s 
partnership.  
The video Lego, everything is not awesome was the most well-known video and it 
received 6 million views on the Internet during the “Boycott the Lego-Shell Partnership” 
campaign (Kirchoff, Van Couvering, & Fast, 2015). This video was completely animated with 
Lego products criticizing the partnership of Lego and Shell as polluting children’s minds and 
ruining the Arctic. In the video, the rising and spreading “black sea water” was gradually 
drowning animals and humans in the Arctic, visualizing that global warming was increasing the 
sea level and oil spills were destroying wildlife and the environment. This 1.46-minute video 
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utilized elements of Lego and Shell to imply that the cooperation of the two companies in the 
real world was going to bring disastrous consequences to the environment and human life. 
The sharing of video resources from YouTube provided social movement actors with 
more autonomy and diverse resources, such as audio, visual and written materials, to frame their 
movement messages. In addition, the YouTube video was circulated on Twitter by activists in 
order to supply extra information to draw public attention to the campaign, justify activists’ 
protest activities, and recruit potential supports to engage in the campaign. As argued in previous 
research, YouTube has become a prevalent social media platform for people to diffuse, view and 
archive videos documenting protests in recent years because it offers individuals free, simple and 
relatively effortless approaches to record, share and spread their messages (Askanius, 2013). 
YouTube plays a role in offering an afterlife for those protest moments that are left behind in 
offline spaces because YouTube provides the opportunity for activists to use a variety of creative 
ways to document and rearticulate the ephemeral visual expressions produced in protests which 
may have been forgotten and neglected (Askanius, 2013). In my research, the analysis of the 
video Lego: Everything is Not Awesome shows that YouTube can also be used by activists to 
release early warnings of potential consequences of protested issues. By doing so, the campaign 
hoped to recruit potential supporters to prevent the Lego-Shell partnership from causing 
detrimental impacts on the environment in the future.  
Twitter content connected to online news institutions accounted for 16.70% of the total 
content with links attached. The Guardian news website was the most commonly shared by 
activists, which accounted for 36.90% of the total link sharing to online news institutions. 
Twitter content linked to The Huffington Post constituted 14.29% of all the link sharing to news 
media. Link sharing to CBC website represented 5.88%. Other news media websites that are 
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shared on Twitter included the websites of Business Insider, Forbes, Global News, Sky News, 
The Times, and The Wall Street Journal.  
As shown in my data, articles posted in The Guardian website were the most commonly 
seen compared to other mass media websites during the campaign. Most articles from The 
Guardian website were shared when Twitter users intended to inform audiences of the successful 
ending of Lego’s partnership with Shell. For example, Greenpeace USA @greenpeaceusa on 
Oct. 9, 2014 wrote “Thanks! Together we'll #SavetheArctic RT @sierraclub Congrats 
@greenpeaceusa for your great Lego victory over Shell!” and attached an article named “Lego 
ends Shell Partnership following Greenpeace Campaign” from The Guardian website. This 
article provided audiences with details of how Lego made the decision to stop renewing its 
contract with Shell under Greenpeace’s pressure. As such, activists intended to provide more 
details to help audiences gain a better understanding of the progress and result of the campaign. 
In addition to news articles reporting the severing of Lego and Shell’s partnership, other news 
articles circulated on Twitter mainly focused on discussing details of the content of Greenpeace 
video Lego, everything is not awesome, the progress of Greenpeace’s campaign or perspectives 
against Shell.  
As can be seen from my data, most news articles from mass media were used by activists 
in Twitter posts when they informed audiences of the progress of the campaign with more 
detailed information and justified protest activities for recruiting potential supporters to engage 
in the campaign. This finding indicates that mass media3 is used as a representative of authority 
as gatekeeper to authenticate movement information and influence public opinions (Iyengar, 
1991; Cappella & Jamieson, 1997; Mattoni, 2012). This may be attributed to the capacity of 
                                                 
3 A detailed analysis of mass media content is not presented since it is outside the scope of my research project. 
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media frames that “operate to select and highlight some features of reality and obscure others in 
a way that tells a consistent story about problems, their causes, moral implications, and 
remedies” (Entman, 2004, p. 77). By apply this structural logic, media frames functioned to 
promote interpretation, evaluation and solutions in the campaign (Entman, 2004; Rivenburgh, 
2013). Moreover, protestors tended to cite news articles that were sympathetic to movements in 
order to justify the rationality of movements because these articles contributed positive media 
coverage, legitimated activists’ perspectives, and criticized the attitudes of governments or 
stakeholders (Papaioannou, 2015).  
Links to organizational websites shared by activists on Twitter accounted for 14.91% of 
the total link sharing. The majority of these links were directed to Greenpeace websites, which 
constituted 85.33% of the total link sharing to organizational websites. Links to other 
organizational websites, such as EcoWatch, can also be seen on Twitter. Specifically, the linked 
articles from Greenpeace websites focused on showing more detailed information about plans for 
the campaign, articulating reasons for taking action, and updating activists’ online and offline 
activists. These articles were mostly used to support tweets that discussed Lego severing its 
partnership with Shell and asked movement participants to pressure Lego to end its partnership 
with Shell. Despite the important role of mass media attention, my findings show that 
environmental websites4 can provide more detailed articulation of campaign-related information 
that can support the campaign and more favourable statements that can shape public opinions 
(Stoddart & MacDonald, 2011; Stoddart et al., 2015).  
My analysis of different types of link sharing shows that the “Boycott the Lego-Shell 
Partnership” campaign made strategic use of a broad range of communication resources and 
                                                 
4 A detailed analysis of environmental website content is not presented since it is outside the scope of my research 
project. 
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operated within complex and multifaceted repertoires of communication (Mattoni, 2013). 
Content created by authors on websites, such as online news articles and organizational articles, 
and user-generated content on different social media platforms, such as YouTube, Facebook and 
Instagram, were both seen on Twitter (Walther & Jang, 2012; Neubaum & Krämer, 2017). 
Specifically, my findings suggest that social media platforms were tools to circulate information 
with individual and self-configurable features that were not usually seen on mainstream mass 
media or organizational websites. In addition, Twitter as a social media platform played a role in 
converging information from mass media and organizations, rather than offering detailed and 
comprehensive information that organizational websites and mass media websites were more 
proficient in. As such, the use of social media has not replaced mass media in contemporary 
social movements. Instead, a variety of communication channels are interconnected and 
coordinated in mobilization.  
 
Summary 
The analysis of the “Boycott the Lego-Shell Partnership” campaign shows an evolving 
relationship of individuals and social movement organizations in which social movement 
organizations still played an important role in mobilizing while keeping a coordinating 
relationship with digitally networked individuals. A number of social movement organizations 
achieved a larger scale of action through mesomobilization on Twitter. In order to mobilize the 
campaign, activists framed campaign-related discourses through both written and visual 
communication. Specifically, activists mobilized both online and offline action as opportunities 
for people to engage in the campaign and used morality as emotional leverage to recruit potential 
campaign supporters. In order to promote campaign-related content, activists made strategic use 
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of a broader range of communication resources and operated within a more complex and 
multifaceted media environment that was facilitated by repertoires of communication (Mattoni, 
2013). 
In the next section, I examine the “Free the Arctic 30” campaign and explore the 
similarities and differences between both of the campaigns.  
 
Critical Event Two: the “Free the Arctic 30” Campaign  
 As part of the campaign against oil exploitation in the Arctic, 30 Greenpeace activists and 
crew members from different countries sailed the Greenpeace ship Arctic Sunrise into the Arctic 
and attempted to land at Gazprom’s Prirazlomnaya drilling platform as an action to call for an 
end to Arctic drilling in September 2013. When 30 people were climbing the platform, they were 
prevented immediately and arrested by the Russian authorities for further investigation. As the 
news spread, a large number of people started protesting against the Russian authorities by 
mobilizing a variety of action with the hashtag “#freethearctic30” on Twitter to ask for the 
release of the 30 Greenpeace activists. Compared to the “Boycott the Lego-Shell Partnership” 
campaign, the “Free the Arctic 30” campaign further exploited Twitter’s mobilizing abilities due 
to the event’s complexity. I examine the hashtag activities on Twitter in order to provide insights 
into the dynamics of the mobilization of the “Free the Arctic 30” campaign.  
 
Social Movement Actors  
 Like the “Boycott the Lego-Shell Partnership” campaign, activists who played a part in 
the “Free the Arctic 30” campaign can still be defined as individual participants and social 
movement organizations (see Table 2).  
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Greenpeace Organizations Other Groups 
Arctic Sunrise GP Activist Network GP Arctic Watch 350 Australia 
Greenpeace GP Rainbow Warrior Greenpeace Aus Pac Climate Reality 
Greenpeace Bristol GP Volunteering Lab Greenpeace Japan Friends of the Earth 
Greenpeace France Greenpeace Africa Greenpeace Cherbourg ABC the Drum 
Greenpeace Czech Greenpeace Andalucia Greenpeace Dusseldort EcoWatch 
Greenpeace EU Greenpeace Belgium Greenpeace Canterbury HHS Earth Club 
Greenpeace Hannover Greenpeace East Asia Greenpeace Canada WWF 
Greenpeace India Greenpeace Huddersfield Greenpeace Illes Balears WWF EU 
Greenpeace Korea Greenpeace Leeds Greenpeace Napoli WWF New Zealand 
Greenpeace Newcastle Greenpeace Niederrh Greenpeace Netherlands WWF Australia 
Greenpeace Russia Greenpeace Oxford Greenpeace New Zealand WWF Scotland 
Greenpeace Pictures Greenpeace Philippines Greenpeace Pacific Northwest WWF UK 
Greenpeace Pix Greenpeace Portsmouth Greenpeace Reunion Mid Island News 
Greenpeace Quebec Greenpeace Pressdesk Greenpeace Slovensko Imperiled Oceans 
Greenpeace Suomi Greenpeace Starsbourg Greenpeace Southeast Asia  
Greenpeace Sverige Greenpeace UK Greenpeace Switzerland  
Greenpeace USA Greenpeace Vancouver Greenpeace Waltham Forest  
Greenpeace Vaud Save the Arctic   
 
Table 2         Organizational Accounts in the “Free the Arctic 30” Campaign 
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My data shows that organizations created 20.39% of the campaign-related information 
that was collected on Twitter while individual participants produced 79.61% of the total content. 
In terms of retweets in the “Free the Arctic 30” campaign, the majority of the retweets were 
originally produced by social movement organizations, especially Arctic Sunrise, Greenpeace 
and Greenpeace UK. Previous research suggested that retweeting happens when Twitter users 
find the content is impressive and worth spreading (Marwick, 2013). This means social 
movement organizations as movement information sources were given more importance and 
endorsement. In other words, Twitter content created by social movement organizations 
resonated with social movement actors more than the content produced by individual 
participants. As with the finding explored in the “Boycott the Lego-Shell Partnership” campaign, 
Greenpeace organizations as well as other groups still played a central role in mobilizing the 
“Free the Arctic 30” campaign despite the fact that individual participants produced more 
campaign-related content on Twitter.  
Commonly retweeted content focused on two themes. The first one was calling for help 
for the arrested 30 Greenpeace activists. For example, Arctic Sunrise tweeted, “This Saturday in 
#Sydney stand with the Arctic 30 bit.ly/Arctic30_Syd #freethearctic30.” Greenpeace Africa 
tweeted, “Show your support for the Arctic 30, add the twibbon to your proﬁle pics: 
bit.ly/1ev06Zc #FreeTheArctic30.” These tweets show that Greenpeace employed the strategy of 
calling on people to take action to help release 30 Greenpeace activists. Also, Greenpeace 
created both opportunities for individual participants to protest both online and offline. The 
second commonly retweeted theme was online and offline support for the campaign. For 
instance, Greenpeace Aus Pac sent the following online support to the arrested activist: 
“@alexharris1 our mate, fellow diver + all-round super cool work colleague - everyone stands 
 72 
with u #freethearctic30 ow.ly/i/3dltT.” Greenpeace Canada tweeted “Crowds still coming in to 
show ♡ for #FreeTheArctic30 @ #wellington Russian Embassy via @AskWhoopass” with a 
photo of the offline protest scene attached to the Twitter post. Because online action can 
mobilize action-oriented emotions, increase activists’ sense of empowerment, and help protestors 
build collective identities, online action plays an important role in promoting activists’ offline 
engagement (Nip, 2004; Drury et al., 2005; Hara, 2008; Wojcieszak, 2009; Schumann & Klein, 
2015). In other words, tweets created by organizations serve as a source for individual 
motivation (Klandermans, 2004; Earl & Kimport, 2011; Staggenborg & Ramos, 2016). This 
means that social movement organizations play a vital role in offering momentum to movement 
participants, creating protest opportunities and devising strategies (Klandermans, 2004; Earl & 
Kimport, 2011; Staggenborg & Ramos, 2016).  
Despite claims in previous research in the waning influence of social movement 
organizations (Earl & Schussman, 2003; Shirky, 2008; Earl & Kimport, 2011; Castells, 2015) 
and the increasing importance of digitally networked individualist forms of activism in social 
movements (Castells, 2015; Kleinhans, Van Ham & Evans-Cowley, 2015), the “Free the Arctic 
30” campaign shows that social movement organizations remains vital as key social actors. They 
are diffusers of information and frames, and organizers of collective action. Social media may 
allow individual participants to diffuse information to a broader audience, but social movement 
organizations still play a vital role in initiating and structuring collective action within the social 
media field. This is a consistent finding that also appeared in the “Boycott the Lego-Shell 
Partnership” campaign.  
However, as with the “Boycott the Lego-Shell Partnership” campaign, potential activities 
of astroturfing organizations also challenged the role of networked individuals in mobilizing the 
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“Free the Arctic 30” campaign. While some individual protestors could be fake activists 
sponsored by corporations and governments to manipulate movement discourses (Cho, Martens, 
Kim, & Rodrigue, 2011; Greenberg et al., 2011; Wear, 2014), it was beyond my abilities to 
assess or evaluate which users were or were not manipulated by astroturfing organizations.  
In addition to the findings of the changing relationship of social movement organizations 
and digitally networked individuals from the centralized leadership of social movement 
organizations over individual participants (Castells, 2015; Staggenborg & Ramos, 2016), my 
data also shows an evolving relationship of the leading social movement organization and other 
groups in a movement. In terms of all the social movement organizations that produced 
campaign-related information on Twitter, Greenpeace groups produced 96.84% of the total 
content while other groups generated 3.16% of the total content. Greenpeace organizations still 
played a major role in leading the “Free the Arctic 30” campaign with the use of Twitter, but 
many other organizations, such as World Wildlife Fund (WWF), also engaged in action calling 
for the release of 30 Greenpeace activists. Compared to the “Boycott the Lego-Shell Partnership” 
campaign, more regional Greenpeace groups participated in the mobilization of the “Free the 
Arctic 30” campaign. Moreover, different organizations were inclined to diffuse campaign-
related messages that focused on similar themes. 
As with the “Boycott the Lego-Shell Partnership” campaign, calling for action from 
supporters to boycott targeted parties and showing protest action were strategies that Greenpeace 
commonly used to mobilize support for the “Free the Arctic 30” campaign. Greenpeace is known 
for their direct action and contentious identity (Corrigall‐Brown, 2016). Direct action, such as 
calling for audiences to pressure the Russian government, enables Greenpeace to bring 
credibility and draw media attention to the conflict because it is aligned with the general 
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impression of who they were as a group (Corrigall‐Brown, 2016). In addition, audiences have the 
expectation of social movements in which social movement organizations will criticize and 
change the government decision, and meeting the expectation of the audiences can help groups 
increase their media coverage (Corrigall‐Brown, 2016). As such, in order to achieve the protest 
goals, Greenpeace attempted to impress audiences and draw media attention to the issue by 
highlighting that they were dedicated to pressuring the government to release the Arctic 30 with 
the use of direct action.  
The analysis of my data shows that Greenpeace played a major role in mobilizing Russia 
to release 30 Greenpeace activists. However, other organizations also played a part in mobilizing 
support for the campaign. As such, Greenpeace organizations including the head office and 
regional branches worked in solidary with other organizations. In other words, the mobilization 
of releasing 30 Greenpeace activists relied on the coordination of multiple groups rather than a 
single organization. Greenpeace’s ability of mobilizing other organizations to enlarge the scope 
of protests was seen in both the “Boycott the Lego-Shell Partnership” campaign and the “Free 
the Arctic 30” campaign (Gerhards & Rucht, 1992; Earl & Kimport, 2011).  
In terms of Greenpeace organizations that circulated campaign-related content on 
Twitter, Arctic Sunrise produced 28.38% of the total content, Greenpeace generated 9.59% of 
the total content, Greenpeace UK created 8.27% of the total content, Greenpeace PressDesk 
diffused 5.64% of the total content, Greenpeace New Zealand contributed 5.26% of the total 
content, Greenpeace USA posted 3.76% of the total content, and Save the Arctic disseminated 
3.57% of the total content. Similar to the “Boycott the Lego-Shell Partnership” campaign, the 
“Free the Arctic 30” campaign did not simply rely on the head office of Greenpeace. Rather, it 
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was a coordination of the head office and many Greenpeace regional offices that facilitated the 
campaign.  
While circulating a common goal of asking the Russian government to release the Arctic 
30, regional groups also mobilized differently by organizing offline activities in their local 
communities and producing campaign-related information in supporters’ native languages. Since 
the captured 30 activists came from different countries, regional Greenpeace organizations 
sometimes also attempted to mobilize individual participants by drawing protestors attention to 
the activists who were from their local communities. For example, two of Greenpeace UK’s 
tweets stated: “Kieron’s family have shared a letter he sent from Russian prison: 
thetim.es/1gbroWp (paywall link, apologies) #FreeTheArctic30” and “Kieron's friend Max wants 
to see him released immediately. You too can help #FreeTheArctic30: 
greenpeace.org/freeouractivis …” These tweets intended to mobilize social movement actors to 
help release Kieron Bryan who was a journalist from the UK. In order to mobilize a broad 
audience to take action against the Russian government, regional groups attempted to associate 
their campaign-related information with local supporters’ cultural contexts. In other words, 
regional groups played an important role in localizing the international issue of releasing 30 
Greenpeace activists by enabling the issue to resonate with local citizens’ cultural backgrounds 
(Dauvergne & Neville, 2011). As such, the “Free the Arctic 30” campaign relied on a coalition 
of many regional branches instead of one single head office.  
 Therefore, my findings suggest that the “mesomobilization” of Greenpeace and other 
social movement organizations, such as WWF and Nature for Life Conservation Initiative, has 
not been replaced by social media. Instead, social media provides autonomous spaces for social 
movement organizations to coordinate and opportunities for a leading organization to potentially 
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reach out to more organizations (Bennett, 2003a, 2003b, 2004a, 2004b; Earl & Kimport, 2011). 
In addition, mobilizing campaign-related discourses in different cultural contexts is an online 
strategy that social movement organizations employ to resonate with more potential supporters 
and recruit more protestors to participate in mobilization around international issues.  
 
Campaign Targets 
In this section, I discuss who were framed as the targets of the “Free the Arctic 30” 
campaign claim-making and mobilization on Twitter. Then, I use framing theories to examine 
how the targeted issue was interpreted and mobilized on Twitter. 
The main focus of campaign targets was the Russian authorities, which accounted for 
53.00% of the total content identified with targets. All the Twitter content targeting Russian 
authorities presented strongly negative attitudes of protestors towards Russian action regarding 
the 30 activists. The majority of tweets targeting the Russian government called on the Russian 
authorities to release 30 Arctic Sunrise activists or condemned the Russian government for using 
unjustified punishment on the 30 activists. For example, Greenpeace NZ wrote, “Join over 
600,000 people who've sent a message to the Russian Embassy to #FreeTheArctic30 
greenpeace.org/freeouractivis…” Greenpeace UK wrote, “Tell @RussianEmbassy to 
#FreeTheArctic30. Peaceful protesters are being held illegally. The world is watching 
greenpeace.org/freeouractivis …” These tweets show that the Russian government was at the 
center of the conflict and it was considered to be the main culprit of the whole “Free the Arctic 
30” campaign.  
In order to pressure the Russian authorities to release the Arctic 30, social movement 
organizations offered protest opportunities to movement adherents and mobilized them to engage 
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in both online and offline activities. Twitter was employed by social movement organizations to 
connect to potential supporters who shared the same grievances towards the Russian government 
but lacked strategies to pursue their goals (Snow et al., 1986). This finding is similar to the 
finding in the “Boycott the Lego-Shell Partnership” campaign that was supported by the concept 
of frame bridging alignment (Snow et al., 1986). According to my data, a large number of tweets 
appealed to supporters to participate in online and offline activities. This indicates that the 
mobilizing feature of Twitter was considered to be significant and its mobilizing ability was 
widely exploited by social movement organizations in the campaign.  
Despite the fact that online action was encouraged more frequently than offline action on 
Twitter, social movement organizations attempted to coordinate both types of action for 
supporters to participate in. The available online activities in this campaign mostly focused on 
signing online petitions, emailing the Russian Embassy, and adding a Twitter profile picture by 
using Twibbon. Support activities in offline communities, such as demonstrations and 
gatherings, were also informed and advertised on Twitter in order to recruit potential supporters. 
Sometimes, both online and offline activities were offered together in one tweet in order to 
encourage social actors to engage in both types of action. Similar to the “Boycott the Lego-Shell 
Partnership” campaign, low-threshold online participation creates autonomous spaces for 
protestors to plan out their offline protest strategies (Castells, 2015). Online action can also 
increase activists’ sense of empowerment and accomplishment and help construct collective 
identities (Nip, 2004; Drury et al., 2005; Hara, 2008; Wojcieszak, 2009). These action-oriented 
emotions can foster subsequent offline action (Schumann & Klein, 2015), and these offline 
activities can optimize communication among activists (Davis, 2011). Because offline action 
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symbolized the power of invading sites of state power, mobilizing protestors to engage in offline 
activities was likely to create tangible pressure on the Russian government (Castells, 2015).   
 In order to better resonate with movement supporters during the campaign, social 
movement organizations adopted a strategy of frame amplification to optimize their campaign 
frames by promoting the relevant discourses on supporters’ beliefs about how severe the issue or 
grievance was, beliefs about how effective the movement would be, and beliefs about how 
necessary it was to take action on the issue (Snow et al., 1986). One task related to frame 
amplification was to clarify the severity of the issue of arresting 30 Arctic Sunrise activists 
(Snow et al., 1986). In order to accomplish this goal, Greenpeace and other organizations 
justified the Arctic 30’s protest action against oil drilling. Social movement organizations 
expressed their disagreement with the Russian government’s definition of the 30 activists as 
“pirates” or “hooligans”.  
On one hand, social movement organizations directly expressed their grievances and 
criticism to the Russian government. For example, Greenpeace widely circulated a video 
documenting the Russian special forces confronting Greenpeace activists on the Gazprom Arctic 
oil rig. This video described that Russian border guards stormed the Arctic Sunrise ship and 
locked up 30 Greenpeace activists after they attempted to climb Gazprom’s Arctic oil platform 
off the north-eastern coast of Russia. In the video, Russian coast guards wearing black masks 
pointed knives and guns at Greenpeace activists, while the activists voluntarily raised their hands 
in front of the coast guards. The video also showed scenes in which Greenpeace activists were 
pushed over by Russian coast guards. The elements shown about Russian coast guard in the film, 
such as their equipment, movement and appearance, were framed to represent toughness and 
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violence. However, Greenpeace intended to frame their activists as powerless victims by 
showing the peaceful side of their performance in response to the coast guards’ action.   
This video archived the events that happened in offline spaces. In this context, images as 
the signifier of veracity were used to encode the reality and provided an opportunity for 
audiences to access the messages that perhaps had never been available to them (Askanius, 
2013). By using strategies of sequence construction and linking, Greenpeace evoked individual 
anger towards the Russian government by showing the most striking and dramatic moments of 
the event. However, this does not mean that the video showed the full story of the incident. 
Although social media provides individuals with the autonomy to adopt their own frames to 
rearticulate protests in online contexts (Rainie & Wellman, 2012; Askanius, 2013; Castells, 
2015), this also offers activists the opportunity to intentionally discard some fragments of 
protests that are not beneficial to support protest activities. In other words, in addition to 
allowing reality to be archived, reproduced and given new meanings (Askanius, 2013), social 
media can also be used to distort reality. In addition, getting arrested on campaign may be an 
incident that Greenpeace deliberately caused in order to manipulate media attention for 
environmental issues (Doyle, 2003). Therefore, it is likely that the recorded and released content 
in the video is planned beforehand. In this case, social media was not simply used by social 
movement organizations to have an interactive and horizontal communication with movement 
participants. Rather, it was used to manipulate or even mislead activists.   
On the other hand, social movement organizations attempted to express grievances to the 
Russian government by showing supportive perspectives. Social movement organizations 
showed supportive opinions from a variety of authoritative representatives in order to object to 
the arrest of 30 activists by the Russian government. These parties included environmental 
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experts, Nobel Peace Laureates and international politicians. For example, Arctic Sunrise 
tweeted, “Dutch request maritime court to order release of the Arctic 30 
greenpeace.org/international/… #FreeTheArctic30.” Greenpeace Aus Pac wrote, “12 Nobel 
Peace Prize Laureates have voiced their support to #FreeTheArctic30. Join the call: 
bit.ly/193QHUR.” In addition, social movement organizations justified the 30 activists as 
peaceful people but not hooligans. For example, Arctic Sunrise wrote, “The man behind the 
photos that showed us the threat to the Arctic! Denis Sinyakov greenpeace.org/international/… 
#FreeTheArctic30.” Greenpeace tweeted, “Some heroes are just normal people doing their best 
to help save the planet: act.gp/17BxXfa #FreeTheArctic30.” In these tweets, social movement 
organizations intended to leave an impression on audiences that 30 activists were peaceful 
activists who contributed to protecting the environment and the Russian government was the one 
who was actually violent and unjust, which framed the 30 activists as victims that needed to be 
protected.  
 Another task in the frame amplification process is to improve movement frames to 
enhance movement adherents’ beliefs in how effective the movement will become (Snow et al., 
1986). In order to achieve this goal, Greenpeace and other organizations frequently updated the 
information about the progress of the campaign. For example, Greenpeace wrote, “Greenpeace 
@Greenpeace · 21 Nov 2013 Court hearings over for today. 26 of 30 now granted bail and 5 of 
those are out of jail. #FreeColin #FreeTheArctic30.” News about the Russian government 
removing charges from 30 activists and releasing the activists on bail were shown as effective 
progress for the campaign. In addition, social movement organizations widely disseminated 
online and offline support from celebrities, international political forces, Nobel Peace Laureates, 
the Arctic 30’s family members, environmental experts, legal experts, and the Russian president 
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Putin. For example, Greenpeace EU tweeted, “100+ MEPs from 21 #EU countries (7 groups) say 
#FreeTheArctic30 & protect the #Arctic! greenpeace.org/eu-unit/en/blog…” In these tweets, 
social movement organizations framed the widespread support from a variety of parties as an 
effective means to facilitate the campaign. By illustrating that the campaign managed to receive 
plenty of support and recruit many supporters to protest against the Russian government, social 
movement organizations attempted to help movement supporters gain faith in the campaign.  
 In order to articulate how necessary it was to take action on the issue (Snow et at., 1986), 
social movement organizations targeted oil giant Gazprom and criticized activities of oil 
exploitation for their disastrous impacts on the environment. In order to mobilize campaign 
supporters to pressure Russia to release the 30 activists, social movement organizations intended 
to convince the audiences that it was wrong for the Russian government to capture 30 activists 
who protested against oil giant Gazprom. In order to help movement adherents better understand 
why it was valuable to boycott Gazprom, social movement organizations articulated information 
about environmental threat to the Arctic that was potentially caused by Gazprom. For example, 
Greenpeace wrote, “10 reasons to take action to stop #Gazprom's Prirazlomnaya oil platform: 
act.gp/HkWkTQ #SaveTheArctic #FreeTheArctic30.” Another example produced by 
Greenpeace was: “More than 30 million barrels of oil are spilled on land each year by the 
Russian oil industry: act.gp/19U3oDE #FreeTheArctic30.” In these tweets, social movement 
organizations framed oil giant Gazprom as an evil corporation and the 30 activists’ protest 
against Gazprom as justified and peaceful action to protect the environment.  
As with what was shown in the “Boycott the Lego-Shell Partnership” campaign, polar 
bear images were frequently diffused to symbolize the emergence of environmental issues that 
were potentially caused by Arctic oil drilling. The use of polar bear images conveyed a message 
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that polar bears were losing their home because of global warming. By circulating these polar 
bear images, protestors tried to indicate that the Arctic was becoming vulnerable because of oil 
drilling. Previous research argued that striking images depicting destruction attract public 
attention and trigger a moral commitment to act (Anne DiFrancesco & Young, 2011). Thus, the 
destruction of the polar bear’s living environment in the Arctic caused by global warming had 
the capacity to evoke moral shocks among audiences. Moral shocks play a crucial role in 
evoking activists’ outrage, and expressing anger and outrage is the key to help activists 
overcome anxiety and gain hope for mobilization (Castells, 2015). In other words, polar bear 
imagery was used as symbolic material to mobilize supporters to express their outrage towards 
the Russian government and oil giant Gazprom and gain hope for the campaign. This is a 
consistent finding that is also shown in the “Boycott the Lego-Shell Partnership” campaign.  
Apart from polar bear imagery, other visual content was also applied to help frame the 
Arctic 30 issue in the campaign. Photos showing offline protest activities were frequently 
circulated on Twitter. Similar to the finding in the “Boycott the Lego-Shell Partnership” 
campaign, images of Greenpeace’s micro-dramas were shown in order to protest against the 
Russian government in the “Free the Arctic 30” campaign. Micro-dramas, often in the form of 
bold direct action, is a central tactic created by Greenpeace (Doyle, 2003). These stunts are well-
planned and organized in order to overcome difficulties in gaining media attention for 
environmental issues (Doyle, 2003). In addition to common stunts, such as holding banners with 
brief messages and wearing costumes, Greenpeace also circulated more striking moments of the 
campaign on Twitter. One image that was frequently shared on Twitter depicted a Greenpeace 
activist scaling the Eiffel Tower with a banner reading “Free the Arctic 30”. Another commonly-
seen image showed activists sitting in a big model of a cage that referred to the prison where 30 
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Arctic Sunrise activists were kept. Thirty activists getting arrested on camera by Russian coast 
guards seemed to be another important media stunt that Greenpeace created to draw media 
attention to the conflict. This is because the action of getting arrested is considered to be deviant, 
or different from the norm, which is a key characteristic of newsworthiness (Ericson, Baranek & 
Chan, 1987; Doyle, 2003; Lundahl, 2018). Many of these events were documented and diffused 
through photography. Photographs can be carriers and amplifiers of injustice frames, which 
explains how an authority system violates the shared moral beliefs of the general public (Olesen, 
2013). Photographs are potentially able to circulate local/national injustice frames to 
transnational audiences (Olesen, 2013). For example, polar bear images were used to vividly 
depict disastrous impacts of oil drilling on the Arctic’s environment in order to show that the 
government and oil industry violated the public’s moral beliefs. In addition to the use of protest 
banners and the #freethearctic30 hashtag on protest posters, the restriction of the cage 
represented in the photographs alluded to the injustice that the Russian government brought to 
the 30 Greenpeace activists. In order to recruit potential supporters to participate in the campaign 
from different regions and countries, campaign participants presented the injustice frame 
targeting the Russian government’s action on 30 Greenpeace activists through visual 
communication and disseminated their disagreement with the Russian government to global 
audiences.  
In addition, images depicting a dove soaring on a rainbow were circulated to show 
international support. The symbol was also commonly seen in pictures and videos of online and 
offline activities. The symbol of a dove soaring on a rainbow was originally used by Arctic 
Sunrise activists on their ship in order to represent their protest action against oil exploitation. 
Visual markers assist individuals in identifying the orientation of a group and whether or not 
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they belong to a protest as allies (Doerr et al., 2013). Thus, this symbol itself can help the 
campaign gain visibility and remind audiences of 30 activists’ protest action, and the frequent 
use of this symbol in online and offline activities indicates that movement participants sent 
consolidated support to the 30 activists.   
In addition to using the tactic of frame alignment to mobilize, the strategies of targeting 
international politicians and celebrities were also employed in the “Free the Arctic 30” 
campaign. In terms of international political forces, Brazilian, Indian, South African, Australian, 
British and Canadian politicians were all targeted on Twitter. On one hand, they were mostly 
targeted by protestors as potential campaign allies to pressure Russia to release the Arctic 30. For 
example, Greenpeace Aus Pac tweeted, “We are renewing calls for Aus. Govt to step up eﬀorts 
to secure release of Colin Russell greenpeace.org.au/action/?cid=53 #freethearctic30.” On the 
other hand, governments, such as UK and Canada, were also criticized by activists for not 
providing sufficient support to detained British and Canadian. For example, Greenpeace 
Portsmouth tweeted, “@David_Cameron #gazprom deal with UK energy minister? That why so 
little's happening to #FreeTheArctic30? #greenpeace gazprom.com/f/posts/68/960…” 
As can be seen in my findings, protestors called for support from other countries’ 
politicians in order to assemble international political forces to address this issue. This finding 
can be explained by applying the idea of the boomerang effect. This strategy may be used by 
social movement actors to call for action from their international political allies in order to exert 
pressure on their domestic governments and optimize their domestic political practices when 
channels between the state and its domestic actors were blocked (Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Holzer, 
2010). Transnational activists use this strategy to shape issues in transnational activism in order 
to bring local or domestic issues to international attention. The notion of the boomerang effect 
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was developed by Keck and Sikkink (1998) primarily in reference to movements in the Global 
South that intend to draw on resources and political power of social movements in the Global 
North in order to generate pressure on governments within the Global South (Stoddart et al., 
2016). 
However, the “Free the Arctic 30” campaign shows the tactic of the boomerang effect has 
evolved. In the “Free the Arctic 30” campaign, activists employed the boomerang effect strategy 
to bring the issue of the arrest of 30 Greenpeace activists to the attention of international 
politicians in the hope of mobilizing the Russian government to release the thirty activists. As 
shown in this campaign, the boomerang effect was no longer about generating international 
pressure in support of social movements primarily in the Global South. This is consistent with 
the similar argument made about the international targeting of the Canadian government in the 
previous research of Stoddart and his colleagues (Stoddart et al., 2016). My research findings 
show that the boomerang effect was also used by transnational activists to draw international 
politicians to the Russian government’s action on 30 Greenpeace activists within the Global 
North. This indicates that Twitter, as one of the social media platforms, did not only provide 
international audiences with access to a variety of information, but also allowed them to bypass 
the control of the government and become their own broadcasters (Earl & Kimport, 2011; Rainie 
& Wellman, 2012; Serres, 2014; Castells, 2015; Ceron & Memoli, 2016). In other words, social 
media can break restrictions on communication channels between the state and its domestic 
citizens, and serve as tools for activists to bypass their state and reach out to international allies 
more easily and quickly. Thanks to social media, activists have more opportunities and resources 
to express their concerns for environmental issues to domestic and international governments 
than they did in the past.  
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 In addition to calling for help from international politicians, social movement 
organizations also tried to draw celebrities’ attention to the event of the arrest of 30 Greenpeace 
activists. This strategy was also employed in the “Boycott the Lego-Shell Partnership” campaign. 
In the “Free the Arctic 30” campaign, celebrities were mostly asked to help release the 30 
activists from Russia. For example, Greenpeace Cherbourg wrote, “@SamuelLJackson please 
tweet your support now to #FreeTheArctic30, detained for peacefully defending the planet 
greenpeace.org/freeouractivis…” In this tweet, Samuel L. Jackson as an American actor and film 
producer was asked by Greenpeace Cherbourg to help release the Arctic 30. Previous research 
argued that celebrities play a big role in networking with their followers on social media, 
disseminating messages and speaking out for environmental issues as spokespeople with the help 
of their fame (Gamson & Wolfsfeld, 1993; Meyer & Gamson, 1995; Brockington, 2008; 
Brockington, 2009; Ellcessor, 2018). This indicates that the celebrity’s opinions are considered 
to be significant leverage to influence public discourses, and their protest action helps influence 
government decision-making. Thus, it is possible that protestors expected to leverage celebrities’ 
mobilizing abilities to recruit more potential supporters to participate in the campaign and to 
exert pressure on the Russian government. In addition, it seems that protestors recruited 
celebrities by leveraging their reliance on building fame through conservation. Participating in 
environmental movements could offer credit to celebrities (Brockington, 2008). Because social 
media can easily expose celebrities’ personalities and make it possible for audiences to directly 
access celebrities (Ellcessor, 2012), how celebrities decide to get involved in social movements 
on social media directly impacts whether or not they can become famous and accepted by 
audiences. As such, protestors chose to target celebrities because they were likely to receive 
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support from those celebrities who intended to build their fame by improving their performance 
on conversation on social media.   
In addition to supportive discourses on Twitter, counter-movement opinions against 
Greenpeace can also be seen in my data. For example, Twitter user “Assad” wrote, “Those 
Greenpeace idiots deserve to be jailed for 7 years for attacking Russia's oil platform. Not invited! 
#GREENPEACE #FreeTheArctic30.” This tweet shows that the action of 30 Greenpeace 
activists was strongly objected to by some audience members and the “Free the Arctic 30” 
campaign was not supported. In the “Free the Arctic 30” campaign, social media enabled all 
different kinds of voices to be heard. While it increased the exposure of perspectives supporting 
the campaign, it also made counter-movement opinions become visible. In other words, social 
media has brought the opportunities to social movements, but they have also resulted in more 
challenges to social movement actors. 
Also, online action was called in question for its effectiveness. For instance, Twitter user 
“Yrjö Kari-Koskinen” wrote, “Sad stuﬀ happening at the @gp_sunrise. Feels like there's not 
much we can do just by tweeting and mailing #FreeTheArctic30 #SaveTheArctic.” This tweet 
shows that low-cost and fast online tactics are also considered to be ineffective by some people 
(Bromberg, 2013; Lim, 2013; Schumann & Klein, 2015). Similar to what is suggested in the 
“Boycott the Lego-Shell Partnership” campaign, while providing more opportunities for 
individuals to mobilize, online tactics allowed by social media platforms are not fully embraced 
and may be critiqued by some Twitter users.   
Another challenge from social media use was related to surveillance and containment, 
which is also a challenge witnessed in the “Boycott the Lego-Shell Partnership” campaign. In the 
“Free the Arctic 30” campaign, Russian news media was accused of censoring the relevant 
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protest images. For example, Twitter user “Nathaniel @SavageNatPelle” wrote, “Russian media 
blacks out photos in solidarity with photographer jailed with Greenpeace activists 
#FreeTheArctic30.” This tweet described that the photos taken by the arrested journalist Denis 
depicting the conflict between Russian coast guards and 30 Greenpeace activists were censored 
by several Russian media outlets. These photos were censored because Gazprom and the Russian 
government may see them as a potential risk to the government’s and the corporation’s 
reputations (Costanza-Chock, 2004, p. 274; see also Bennett, 2003; Curran et al., 2012; Uldam, 
2016). As such, social movement actors are also confronted with challenges from surveillance by 
corporations and governments on social media. In addition, my data shows one side of opinions 
from campaign supporters but lacks insights into standpoints of Gazprom and the Russian 
government as targeted parties. This could be a strategy that corporations used to protect their 
reputations (Uldam, 2016). By choosing not to respond to critiques on Twitter, Gazprom and the 
Russian government potentially tried to avoid negative impacts on them (Uldam, 2016).  
 
Social Use of Twitter 
 In the “Free the Arctic 30” campaign, link sharing was a main feature of Twitter that 
activists used to reach out to other users and proliferate protest messages. Link sharing for 
external websites was still a common online tactic employed by social movement actors. Among 
all the tweets with links attached, over 40% of the content was linked to online campaigns, such 
as online petition, online emailing, letter writing, and online donations. In this campaign, the use 
of link sharing focused on online campaign strategies and these strategies seemed to be more 
diverse than the other case. As shown in my data, these websites were frequently shared when 
social movement actors urged the Russian government to release the Greenpeace activists. This 
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finding indicates that Twitter was considered to be an important platform which can direct 
movement supporters to participate in the campaign, especially by taking online action.  
Tweets attached to links to organization websites accounted for 23.56% of all the tweets 
with links. The majority of these links are directed to Greenpeace websites, which constituted 
93.68% of the total link sharing to organizational websites. Links to other organizational 
websites, such as the websites of WWF, O Dia da Terra, 350, EcoWatch, and Nobel Women’s 
Initiative, can also be seen on Twitter. As shown in my data, more organizational websites were 
linked in tweets in the “Free the Arctic 30” campaign than the other case, but Greenpeace 
websites were still the most widely shared compared to other organizational websites.  
The commonly shared articles from organization websites focused on showing detailed 
information about online and offline activities that protestors can participate in, articulating 
reasons to support the campaign, and updating the progress that activists made in protest 
activities. These articles were mainly shared in tweets that motivated campaign supporters to 
pressure the Russian government to release the Arctic 30 and justify the Arctic 30’s protest 
action against the Russian oil industry. For instance, Twitter user Mary Grace Kosta wrote, 
“Here are 30 things YOU can do to help #FreeTheArctic30: 
greenpeace.org/canada/en/Blog… … RT @GreenpeaceCA.” In this tweet, the protestor shared 
an article from Greenpeace website providing the ideas of 30 online and offline activities that 
movement participants can do to help the Arctic 30. Another example was: “The UN report 
contains hundreds of pages of evidence to justify the action of the brave Arctic 30. 
act.gp/164Dyda #FreeTheArctic30” produced by Twitter user “Soﬁa von Post”. In this tweet, the 
protestor shared an article named Free the Arctic 30, and lock up fossil fuels from Greenpeace’s 
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website articulating the UN report on the status of the world’s climate in order to argue that the 
action of 30 Greenpeace activists against Gazprom was justified.  
Content from organization websites was usually strongly supportive of the campaign and 
its activists. Movement participants circulated the content from organization websites, on one 
hand, to supplement more detailed information about the event for the general public (Stoddart & 
MacDonald, 2011; Stoddart et al., 2015). On the other hand, they intended to promote the 
solution of the issue with strong and inspiring arguments made by organizations (Stoddart & 
MacDonald, 2011; Stoddart at al., 2015). This is a consistent finding that is also shown in the 
“Boycott the Lego-Shell Partnership” campaign.  
Regarding the links to online news institutions, 17.60% of the examined tweets were 
linked to news media. Specifically, The Guardian website was the most commonly shared by 
activists, which accounted for 17.69% of the total link sharing to online news institutions. 
Twitter content linked to BBC website constituted 11.92% of all the link sharing to news media. 
Link sharing to The Huffington Post website represented 5%. Other news media websites that 
were shared on Twitter include The New York Times, Reuters, The Independent, Sky News, ABC, 
CBC, CNN, China Daily, Los Angeles Times, The Times and The Washington Post. As with the 
“Boycott the Lego-Shell Partnership” campaign, articles created by The Guardian website were 
the most commonly circulated compared to other mass media. 
Most articles from mass media websites were shared when Twitter users intended to 
pressure the Russian government to release the Arctic 30 and justify the action of 30 Greenpeace 
activists against Gazprom. The mass media articles informed the audiences of the online and 
offline support given by supporters and updated the progress of how the Russian government 
was addressing the Arctic 30 case. For example, Twitter user “Mina*Bad Yoga KittyⓋ” posted 
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the following: “#FreeTheArctic30 Sir Paul McCartney urges #Putin to leniency for #Greenpeace 
detainees bbc.in/1ieQwtW NB Nov 16 GLOBAL DAY OF ACTION.” This tweet shared an 
article from the BBC website that showed a letter written by Paul McCartney (who was a 
member of the rock band The Beatles) to Russia’s president Vladimir Putin. This letter called for 
the release of the 30 Greenpeace activists who were detained in Russia.  
In addition to news articles reporting updated news about the Arctic 30 event, activists 
also shared opinion articles that were published to comment on the arrest of 30 Greenpeace 
activists. For instance, Twitter user “Ysbryd PPFOB” wrote, “Where's the support for the jailed 
Artic 30 activist Colin Russell? | Andrew Wilkie gu.com/p/3k3xp/tw via @guardian 
#FreeTheArctic30.” This tweet called for support for one of the Arctic 30, Colin Russell, and the 
article from The Guardian appealed to the Australian government to help release this activist and 
articulated the reason why the government should protect its citizens. Media articles shared on 
Twitter by movement supporters were aligned with the content of tweets where the links were 
shared. Mass media articles were commonly shared when the authors describe more detailed 
information about the progress of the campaign or present similar opinions as movement support 
in their tweets. It seems that mass media content was circulated by social movement actors to 
support the veracity of Twitter messages or to enhance the perspectives of Twitter users against 
protest targets.  
As with the analysis of the “Boycott the Lego-Shell Partnership” campaign, my findings 
in the “Free the Arctic 30” campaign also indicate that mass media is used as a representative of 
authority to authenticate movement information and influence public opinions (Mattoni, 2012; 
Cappella & Jamieson, 1997; Iyengar, 1991). This may be attributed to the capacity of media 
frames that can apply a structural logic to promote interpretation, evaluation and solutions 
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(Entman, 2004; Rivenburgh, 2013). Moreover, protestors are inclined to cite mass media articles 
sympathetic to movements in order to justify the rationality of movements because these articles 
contribute positive media coverage or opinions that legitimate activists’ perspectives or criticize 
the attitudes of governments or stakeholders (Papaioannou, 2015). In the “Free the Arctic 30” 
campaign, social movement actors attempted to leverage mainstream mass media discourses to 
influence how audiences perceived the “Free the Arctic 30” campaign.  
With reference to linking to other social media, 15.71% of the examined Twitter content 
had links to other social media platforms. Of these links, 28.02% were connected to YouTube, 
16.38% were directed to Facebook, 9.48% were directed to Instagram, 8.62% were associated 
with Tumblr, 7.33% were connected to Flickr, 4.74% were directed to other Twitter posts, and 
1.29% of them were connected to Vimeo.  
My data shows that image and video-sharing websites were the most widely shared by 
social movement actors. As with the “Boycott the Lego-Shell Partnership” campaign, sharing 
visual materials from other social media platforms provides social movement actors with more 
autonomy and diverse resources, such as audio, visual and written materials, to frame their 
messages (Staggenborg & Ramos, 2016). In addition, these platforms had a variety of pictures 
and video clips that presented extra information about the campaign, and many of these pictures 
and videos were not included on mass media websites and organizational websites. In other 
words, these resources from other social media platforms were produced by activists to bypass 
mass media and the control of governments and corporations (Earl & Kimport, 2011; Uldam & 
Askani, 2013; Castells, 2015; Ceron & Memoli, 2016). As such, the sharing of information from 
other social media platforms could provide audiences with unique insights that were different 
from mainstream voices.  
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My analysis of different types of link sharing shows that the “Free the Arctic 30” 
campaign made strategic use of a broader range of communication resources and operated within 
a more complex and multifaceted media environment that was facilitated by repertoires of 
communication (Mattoni, 2013). This is a consistent finding that is also suggested in the 
“Boycott the Lego-Shell Partnership” campaign. Content created by authors on the website, such 
as online news articles and organizational articles, and user-generated content on different social 
media platforms, such as YouTube, Facebook and Instagram, converged on Twitter (Walther & 
Jang, 2012; Neubaum & Krämer, 2017). Specifically, my findings suggest that social media 
platforms are considered to be tools to show information with individual and self-configurable 
features that is not found on mainstream mass media or organizational websites. In addition, 
Twitter as a social media platform plays a role in converging information from different mass 
media and organizational sources, rather than offering the more detailed and comprehensive 
information that organizational websites and mass media websites are more proficient in. As 
such, the use of social media has not replaced mass media in contemporary social movements. 
Instead, a variety of communication channels are interconnected and coordinated in 
mobilization.  
 
Conclusion  
In this chapter, I examined the “Boycott Lego-Shell Partnership” and “Free the Arctic 
30” critical events, which are part of the broader “Save the Arctic” campaign against Arctic oil 
development. The main themes of the collected Twitter content in both critical events can be 
seen from the table as below:  
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 The “Boycott the Lego-Shell” Campaign The “Free the Arctic 30” Campaign 
1 Directly calling for a termination of Lego 
and Shell’s cooperation 
Calling for help for the arrested 30 
Greenpeace activists 
 
2 Asking movement participants to take online 
and offline action to pressure Lego to stop 
its partnership with Shell 
 
Online and offline support for the 
campaign 
 
3 The visual use of Lego mini figures for 
protest 
 
 
 
My findings show that while social media may allow individual participants to diffuse 
information to a broader audience, social movement organizations still play a vital role in 
initiating and structuring collective action within the social media field. Through my research, 
we gain further understanding of the changing relationship between social movement 
organizations and networked individuals in digital activism facilitated by social media.  
My findings also suggest that a hybrid protest space consisting of digital social networks 
and offline support communities is established to assemble and recruit campaign adherents to 
take action (Castells, 2015). As another protest strategy, moral shocks are commonly used as 
emotional leverage to help movement supporters express outrage and transform emotion into 
action (Castells, 2015). The emotion of moral shocks is widely disseminated via visual 
communication on Twitter. Images are used as symbols and metaphors to gain visibility for the 
campaigns, shape public image of protest activities, and persuade the audiences to engage in the 
campaigns (Lyer & Oldmeadow, 2006; Joffe, 2008; O’Neill & Nicholson-Cole, 2009; Anne 
DiFrancesco & Young, 2011; Doerr et al., 2013). Furthermore, while the original model of the 
boomerang effect suggested that social movements in the Global South sought international 
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allies from the Global North to bring pressure on their domestic governments from outside, my 
research argues that the boomerang effect is no longer used only to generate international 
pressure in support of social movements primarily in the Global South (Keck & Sikkink, 1998; 
Stoddart et al., 2016). As such, my study contributes to understanding of how protest tactics shift 
through social media activism. 
Finally, my findings argue that social media does not wholly replace the importance of 
mass media coverage for social movements, but they help create a more complex and 
multifaceted media landscape for movements to navigate and make use of, which is consistent 
with the notion that social movements rely on increasingly broad repertoires of communication 
(Mattoni, 2012, 2013). My findings contribute insights into how the role of media environment 
in shaping public image of protests changes in the era of social media.  
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Chapter Five: Discussion and Conclusion 
Throughout my thesis, I applied the literature on social movement and digital media to 
examine the changing relationship between social movement organizations and networked 
individuals in the “Boycott Lego-Shell Partnership” and “Free the Arctic 30” critical events in 
the “Save the Arctic” campaign. I used concepts like frame alignment processes, the boomerang 
effect, e-tactics, and visual communication to investigate how protest strategies shift through 
social media activism. I engaged the notion of repertories of communication with my analysis of 
changing media environments for social movements. In this final chapter, I discuss my findings 
in terms of the similarities and differences in the mobilization of two critical events and stress the 
significance of my research. Then, I outline the limitations of my research project. Finally, I 
propose recommendations for future research.  
 
Discussion of Findings 
Social media presents environmental movements with both opportunities and challenges. 
Through examining the “Save the Arctic” campaign, I provide insights into the dynamics of 
environmental movements in contemporary societies. I summarize and compare the findings 
from the “Boycott Lego-Shell Partnership” and “Free the Arctic 30” events that I have discussed 
in the previous chapters in order to answer my research questions:  
1. Who played a role in mobilizing the “Save the Arctic” campaign on Twitter?  
2. What kind of discourses were produced to respond to the oil conflict on Twitter during the “Save 
the Arctic” campaign, and how did the Twitter content frame the campaign?  
3. How was Twitter used by activists to extend and promote campaign-related messages in the 
“Save the Arctic” campaign?    
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My findings show that social movement information is widely proliferated by individuals 
with the aid of social media, such as Twitter, but the messages generated by social movement 
organizations resonate more with activists and receive more endorsement from them than content 
produced by individuals. My finding indicates that social media offers individuals more 
autonomy to express themselves publicly and enlarge the scope of engagement in contemporary 
social movements compared to traditional movements. However, social movement organizations 
still play a key role in the “Boycott the Lego-Shell Partnership” campaign and the “Free the 
Arctic 30” campaign (Earl & Kimport, 2011). Despite claims about the waning influence of 
social movement organizations (Earl & Schussman, 2003; Shirky, 2008; Earl & Kimport, 2011; 
Castells, 2015) and the increasing importance of networked individualist forms of activism 
(Castells, 2015; Kleinhans, Van Ham & Evans-Cowley, 2015), my study shows that social 
movement organizations remain significant as diffusers of information and frames and 
organizers of collective action in social movements. In other words, social media may allow 
individual participants to diffuse information to a broader audience, but social movement 
organizations still play a vital role in initiating and structuring collective action within the social 
media field. Social movement organizations and networked individuals have become 
interconnected and coordinated to mobilize with the aid of social media. Through my research, 
we gain further understanding of the changing relationship between social movement 
organizations and networked individuals in digital activism facilitated by social media.  
In terms of the relationship of different organizations in the two campaigns, my findings 
show that the mobilization of issues related to Arctic oil drilling relied on a coordination of 
multiple groups, rather than a single organization. In other words, the mesomobilization of 
different social movement organizations plays a vital role in enlarging the movement scope and 
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recruiting potential supporters (Gerhards & Rucht, 1992; Earl & Kimport, 2011). In both 
campaigns, Twitter was used to facilitate the process of mesomobilization by enabling social 
movement organizations to connect and communicate with each other more easily and reach a 
broader public (Rainie & Wellman, 2012; Browning, 2013). This is perhaps because social 
media allows movement organizations to collaborate with one another in order to achieve a 
larger movement than any single group can generate through the process of mesomobilization 
(Bennett, 2003a, 2003b, 2004a, 2004b; Earl & Kimport, 2011). As such, the coordination of 
different movement organizations is indispensable for social movements in the social media era. 
In addition, the two campaigns relied on a coalition of many regional branches rather than any 
single office. Concerning the relationship of various branches within Greenpeace, regional 
organizations localized the international issue of Arctic oil drilling in the campaign by 
disseminating information in the native languages of local citizens and organizing protest 
activities in local communities. This suggests that Greenpeace tries to promote the resonance of 
their protest messages with international audiences in ways that address linguistic and cultural 
barriers in transnational environmental movements because campaign frames might be perceived 
differently by different audiences based on their cultural backgrounds (Dauvergne & Neville, 
2011). My findings explore the implication of the mesomobilization by social movement 
organizations. It is not only about the scope of coalition of different movement organizations, but 
also about the ability to understand various cultural contexts in which individual activists are 
embedded.  
In order to align individuals’ discursive activities and recruit potential supporters to 
engage in the campaigns, social movement organizations employed frame alignment processes as 
core tasks to depict problematic situations and propose relevant action on Twitter in both the 
 99 
“Boycott Lego-Shell Partnership” campaign and the “Free the Arctic 30” campaign (Snow et al., 
1986). Framing strategies that were used in these two campaigns appeared to be interconnected 
but also independent. As the first step of framing, social movement organizations in the “Boycott 
Lego-Shell Partnership” campaign identified on Twitter the problematic partnership of Lego and 
Shell that was considered to be devastating to the Arctic and attributed the blame to Lego and 
Shell (Benford & Snow, 2000). In the “Free the Arctic 30” campaign, the core issue determined 
by social movement organizations on Twitter was that the Russian government arrested and 
detained 30 Arctic Sunrise activists for protesting against the oil giant Gazprom. The Russian 
authorities were identified as the target to blame in this campaign. Next, the solutions and plans 
of action were proposed for the issues (Benford & Snow, 2000). As the solution for the Lego-
Shell partnership, social movement organizations pressured Lego to end their partnership with 
Shell. In terms of the dilemma of the 30 Arctic Sunrise activists, social movement organizations 
pressured the Russian authorities to release the Arctic 30.  
In order to promote solutions for these issues, a variety of e-tactics were employed 
through Twitter as the process of frame bridging alignment to assemble and recruit campaign 
adherents to take action (Snow et al., 1986; Earl & Kimport, 2011). On one hand, social 
movement actors encouraged audience members to participate in online and/or offline action. On 
the other hand, they showed support coming from online and offline protest activities on Twitter. 
In both campaigns, online action consists of a step on a ladder of engagement to foster 
subsequent offline action (Schumann & Klein, 2015) because low-threshold online participation 
creates an autonomous space for protestors to plan out their offline protest strategies (Castells, 
2015), and showing activists’ support online could also boost a sense of empowerment and 
engagement (Nip, 2004; Drury et al., 2005; Hara, 2008; Wojcieszak, 2009). Despite the critical 
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voices questioning the effectiveness of online tactics (Bromberg, 2013; Lim, 2013), online 
tactics are still widely used by activists as important methods to engage in the campaigns. The 
analysis of two critical moments in the “Save the Arctic” campaign suggests that contemporary 
movements do not simply rely on online action or activities in offline spaces. Rather, it is a 
hybrid protest space consisting of digital social networks and offline support communities that 
lies at the centre of environmental movements in the social media age (Castells, 2015). 
Therefore, it could be helpful for activists to make strategic use of both online and offline 
activities if they expect to mobilize more supporters to engage in social movements.  
As one strategy to facilitate the solution of issues, celebrities were mobilized by activists 
to support the campaigns. This finding suggests that celebrities are appointed a prominent role in 
mobilization around environmental issues. The important role of celebrities is also demonstrated 
in previous research literature (Brockington, 2008; Brockington, 2009; Tsaliki, 
Frangonikolopoulos & Huliaras, 2011). Calling on celebrities to help mobilize can increase the 
exposure for environmental issues, raise public awareness, direct media attention on the issues, 
and justify the rationality of the movements (Rohlinger, 2002; Brockington, 2009; Tsaliki, 
Frangonikolopoulos & Huliaras, 2011). On the other hand, celebrities can also rely on 
conversation to construct their celebrity (Brockington, 2008). Their involvement in supporting 
environmental causes is leveraged to develop their entertainment career (Brockington, 2008; 
Tsaliki, Frangonikolopoulos & Huliaras, 2011). According to the written and visual content I 
collected on Twitter, many celebrities participated in either online or offline activities. Because 
social media can easily expose celebrities’ personalities and make it possible for audiences to 
directly access celebrities (Ellcessor, 2012), how celebrities decide to get involved in social 
movements on social media directly impacts their fame and popularity. Therefore, it is also likely 
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for celebrities to seek cooperation with Greenpeace by offering to engage in the campaigns in 
order to increase their exposure on social media.  
As another strategy to help address the issue, activists asked international political actors 
to take action in the “Free the Arctic 30” campaign. Movement supporters mobilized political 
forces from Brazil, India, South Africa, Australia, UK, Canada and other countries on Twitter to 
compel Russian authorities to release the Arctic 30. This strategy is described as the “boomerang 
effect” by Keck and Sikkink (1998). However, the “Free the Arctic 30” campaign showed an 
evolution of the boomerang effect in the era of digital activism. In traditional social movements, 
the boomerang effect was used by social movements in the Global South to seek international 
allies from the Global North in order to exert pressure on domestic governments in the Global 
South (Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Stoddart et al., 2016). However, the boomerang effect is no longer 
used only to generate international pressure in support of social movements primarily in the 
Global South (Stoddart et al., 2016). Social media, such as Twitter, helps the boomerang pattern 
of influence characteristic of transnational networks evolve from this vertical pattern into a more 
horizontal form. This strategy is now also used by transnational movements to seek international 
allies from both northern and southern arenas to try to bring pressure on governments in the 
Global North. Social media provides activists across the globe with access to politicians through 
their official social media accounts, which makes it simpler and faster for domestic social 
movement actors to bypass their state and search out international allies. Meanwhile, the threats 
of climate change to the Arctic have been reconfigured as matters of global concern, prompting 
transnational activists to participate in Arctic-related activities. My research contributes insights 
into how the dynamics of the boomerang effect is shifting through social media activism.   
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As the last step of shaping the discourses about the two campaigns on Twitter (Benford & 
Snow, 2000), social movement organizations produced an appealing and convincing rationale to 
justify their action. This motivational rationale was constructed in order to transform individuals’ 
emotion to action. In order to achieve this transformation, social movement actors are required to 
incite anger and outrage because it is the key to overcoming anxiety and creating hope to pursue 
their goals (Castells, 2015). In the “Boycott Lego-Shell Partnership” campaign, activists tried to 
justify their protest action through political consumerism, which combines morality and the 
market (Holzer, 2010). By framing the partnership of Lego and Shell as a negative impact on 
children, activists expected to change shopping decisions of parents who were the main 
consumers of Lego products and used them to protest Lego and Shell. In both campaigns, 
activists sent direct condemnation from a variety of parties to the targets that were responsible 
for the conflicts as ways to express their grievances and outrage. In addition, both campaigns 
widely circulated discourses of environmental disruption caused by Arctic oil drilling, especially 
the threat to polar bears. The cruel living condition of polar bears was frequently depicted in 
striking pictures and these images enabled social movement organizations to draw public 
attention and trigger their moral commitment to take action (Anne DiFrancesco & Young, 2011).  
However, the reliance on polar bear politics as a framework for communicating about 
climate change shifts attention away from human communities in the north. This is a critique that 
was argued in previous research (Wright, 2014; Callison, 2014; Martinez, 2014). Indigenous 
people are also affected by the consequences of climate change, such as more intense storms, the 
loss of wildlife habitat, and the loss and excess of water (Callison, 2014; Martinez, 2014). While 
polar bears are frequently highlighted as the victims of climate change in social movements, the 
devastating impact of climate change on Inuit and Alaska Native cultures is neglected. The issue 
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of climate change is not only about environmental challenges, but it is also about the 
colonization of northern communities (e.g. land and resources) and cultures, and a matter of 
sovereignty and human rights (Martinez, 2014; Wright, 2014; Shadian, 2014).  
In a nutshell, my research explores how emotion is mobilized on social networking 
platforms to encourage individuals to engage in social movements. The proliferation of social 
media platforms provides individuals with more autonomy and flexibility to share their feelings 
with others and also enables their voices to reach a broader public through their networks on 
social media. My findings reveal that the significant role of both outrage and hope as emotional 
resources that initialize social movements has not changed. However, what has changed is that 
the tools social movement actors use to mobilize outrage and hope have become extended and 
enhanced.  
My study provides insights into how visual communication is used as part of social 
movement framing in digital forms of mobilization. Visual analysis of protest practices should be 
integrated with text-based approaches to analysis to better understand transnational 
environmental contention because visual communication plays a vital role in framing 
environmental issues and disseminating information in environmental movements. Thanks to the 
participatory and interactive features of social media, pictures and videos can be uploaded online 
in real time by activists to diffuse information about protests through visual narratives. These 
visual materials documenting protest in offline spaces provide the opportunity for audiences to 
access authentic protest messages online. Visual markers like symbols assist individuals in 
identifying the orientation of a group and whether or not they belong to a protest as allies (Doerr 
et al., 2013). These visual materials are virally disseminated by social media users to reach a 
broad audience beyond the social movement scene, and thus they are able to shape public images 
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of protests and help construct collective identities (Doerr et al., 2013). In other words, visual 
communication is able to produce the power of persuasion and mobilization because images can 
easily communicate metaphor and rearticulate reality (Lyer & Oldmeadow, 2006; Joffe, 2008; 
O’Neill & Nicholson-Cole, 2009; Anne DiFrancesco & Young, 2011).  
By looking at link sharing, my study suggests that social media is not only seen as an 
opportunity for protest actors to create their own frames to shape conflicts, but they are also 
perceived as platforms for social movement actors to enhance the influence of their information. 
In both events of the “Save the Arctic” campaign, activists commonly shared online campaign 
websites, mass media websites, organizational websites and other social networking websites in 
their Twitter posts. By doing so, protestors expected to gain more public visibility for the issues, 
to provide more detailed information, and to engage a broader public in action through Twitter. 
In other words, Twitter as a social media platform plays a role in converging information from 
mass media and organizations, rather than offering detailed and comprehensive information that 
organizational and mass media websites are more proficient in. In comparing mainstream mass 
media and organizational websites, Twitter is more effective for sharing information with 
individual and self-configurable features that are not usually seen on mainstream mass media or 
organizational websites. 
The development of information and communication technologies has transformed the 
mainstream-dominated media system into a complex and multifaceted media environment that is 
facilitated by repertoires of communication (Mattoni, 2012, 2013). In other words, the Internet 
and social networking platforms have challenged the monopoly of traditional mass media over 
the representation of social movements. The role of shaping public image of protests has shifted 
from mainstream mass media to a more complex and multifaceted media platform consisting of 
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mass media and social media. What I want to stress here is that mass media still functions as 
crucial platforms for social movement actors to accomplish their mobilization goals and they 
have not been replaced by social media. Rather, social media helps create a more complex and 
multifaceted media landscape that is more diverse than before for movements to navigate and 
make use of (Mattoni, 2012, 2013). My study contributes insights into the interconnection of 
social media and traditional mainstream media. These repertories of communication require 
social movement actors to learn to make strategic use of a broader range of communication tools.  
Finally, while social media empowers individuals with more autonomy to mobilize 
around environmental issues, they also allow the perspectives of counter-movement actors to 
become more visible and easier to access. The analysis of the “Save the Arctic” campaign shows 
that some people did not support Greenpeace’s campaign or held a questioning attitude towards 
the effectiveness of social media in mobilization around environmental issues. As shown in my 
data, Greenpeace was also criticized for its extreme protest action. For some audience members, 
low-risk online tactics, such as tweeting or emailing, were considered to be inefficient in terms 
of bringing about measurable social changes. This finding suggests that the capacity of online 
activism for producing substantial changes is still under discussion and needs additional 
investigation and evaluation. These findings imply that campaign frames and strategies in the 
“Save the Arctic” campaign were not fully embraced by audiences and may be critiqued by some 
Twitter users. In other words, social media can easily expose counter-movement opinions and 
challenge social movements. 
 
Limitations  
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 One of the limitations of my research design is the size of the sample. This limitation 
resides in three aspects. First, I only chose to examine the “Save the Arctic” campaign. The 
adverse impact of oil exploitation and consumption on the climate and environment is a critical 
issue that has been widely discussed in recent years. The “Save the Arctic” campaign was an 
influential environmental movement mobilized in both offline and cyber spaces to protect the 
Arctic from oil drilling, and it also received a large response from global audiences online and 
offline. Therefore, the “Save the Arctic” campaign is a representative case to explore how 
contemporary environmental movements unfold in the social media age. Despite its uniqueness, 
it can only contribute limited insights into the dynamics of environmental movements in the era 
of social media. For instance, my research project lacks insights into how environmental 
movements mobilize around the negative impact of climate change on human communities in the 
Arctic on social media platforms. In addition, I was not able to analyze how other conflicts 
related to oil exploration and climate change were mobilized and how other types of 
environmental issues were mobilized in digital activism. Therefore, my study might not present a 
comprehensive and integrated picture of environmental activism against oil development in the 
social media era, and it is likely that not all my research findings can be applied to explain 
movements targeting other environmental issues.  
Second, my research only focuses on Twitter. During the process of data collection and 
analysis, I found that Twitter presented a discussion of oil conflict in the Arctic from diverse 
sources, such as individual activists, social movement organizations, politicians, and celebrities, 
and relevant content was presented using a variety of tactics, such as textual communication, 
visual communication and link sharing. I realized the complexity of the Twitter content enabled 
me to explore the “Save the Arctic” campaign at a more comprehensive level. However, limited 
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research time did not allow me to fully examine other social networking platforms, such as 
Facebook, YouTube, Flickr, or Instagram. Social movement actors might have different 
strategies to employ on different social media based on the advantages of their platform features. 
Thus, I could miss characteristics of the “Save the Arctic” campaign on other social media 
platforms.  
Another limitation of my research design is the sampling strategy for the “Save the 
Arctic” campaign. The “Save the Arctic” campaign rose in 2012 and subsided in 2015, and the 
main stage of the campaign lasted 5 years. While I was searching the relevant data to this 
campaign, I found there were tens of thousands of tweets on Twitter which were related to the 
discussion. Due to time constraints, I needed to narrow the scope of my research data and tease 
out the most valuable and relevant data to answer my research questions. Thus, I decided to 
locate a few key words/hashtags which could construct a feasible sample size for examining the 
“Save the Arctic” campaign. This sampling strategy eventually helped me locate two critical 
moments in the “Save the Arctic” campaign which are the “Boycott Lego-Shell Partnership” 
campaign and the “Free the Arctic 30” campaign. This sampling strategy only allowed me to 
explore two critical events that were most typical of the “Save the Arctic” campaign, but there 
were other smaller scale events or less typical moments during the campaign that were missing 
from my case study. Therefore, the dynamics of the “Save the Arctic” campaign shown in my 
analysis was perhaps less diverse than in actuality. Besides, I analyzed a 10% sample of the 
“Free the Arctic 30” campaign when I was examining this event. I was aware that a 10% sample 
was not an ideal sample size, but it made sense in terms of constructing a corpus of data that was 
feasible given available resources.  
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 Other methodological limitations include the barriers of textual analysis. The textual data 
I gathered for my research was already generated on Twitter before I started my study, but the 
interpretation I contributed to the data was directed by my knowledge in sociological fields and 
my cultural backgrounds. In other words, my understandings of the data were not equal to the 
actual viewpoints and explanations that social movement actors had for the “Save the Arctic” 
campaign. This is also known as the problem of inference in textual analysis (Cottle, 2003). This 
means textual analysis only allowed me to provide insights into the campaign based on my own 
research standpoint, and I might not have an accurate grasp of all the data that I examined by 
only using textual analysis.  
 
Recommendation for Future Research  
 Based on my research findings, some additional research could be conducted to gain a 
deeper insight into the interaction of social media and social movements. The first area that 
would be worthwhile to examine is how social movement actors actually planned to use social 
media to mobilize the “Save the Arctic” campaign versus how I interpreted this from my data. 
One of the limitations of my study is that the meaning of textual content that I interpreted may 
not be aligned with the intention of content producers. This concern can be addressed through 
interviewing because it helps researchers explore complicated phenomena that may be hidden or 
unseen and gain insights into the perspectives of social movement actors who were directly 
involved in the “Save the Arctic” campaign (Tracy, 2012). As such, it would be useful to 
conduct interviews with organizational leaders and individual protestors because content 
producers would be able to offer more critical insights into the “Save the Arctic” campaign and 
the social dynamics of content production and reception.  
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 The second recommendation for future research is exploring how the targets of conflicts 
respond to social movements. Throughout my research, I examined a variety of supportive 
responses to Arctic oil conflict from social movement organizations, individual participants, 
celebrities and international politicians, and also examined how social media was employed by 
movement supporters to mobilize around social issues. However, the viewpoints from the oil 
industry and governments as mobilization targets were not obvious on Twitter based on my 
sample and keyword search strategies. The role of social media in mobilizing the perspectives of 
these stakeholders remained unknown. Thus, it would be useful for future research to look into 
how the mobilization targets considered the role of social media in response to Arctic oil conflict 
or other environmental issues and how environmental movement opponents used social media to 
respond to challenges. Research in these questions could present a contrast between the social 
media use of movement supporters and movement targets and also provide a more critical 
understanding of the influence of social media in digital activism.  
 Another recommendation is for a broader study of social movements and digital media. 
Future research should consider how other factors potentially influence the role of social media 
in mobilizing social movements. My research findings about the role of social media in 
mobilizing environmental movements can be used as a general reference to explain other 
environmental activities mobilized with the aid of social media. However, there are other 
elements I did not have an opportunity to examine that may also affect social media uses, such as 
the impact of governmental policies on social media, the competences for social media that users 
have, the activity funding of an organization, and the role of astroturfing activities in shaping 
social media as a dispersed space of social movement mobilization. These elements would affect 
how accessible social media is to audiences, how proficient activists are in social media uses, 
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and the authenticity of digitally networked individualism. Any of these elements is likely to 
affect how social media plays a role in different social movements in different regions. 
Therefore, exploring how other resources interconnect with social media in a movement would 
help us better understand the opportunities and challenges of digital activism is facing in 
contemporary societies.  
 Finally, I recommend that researchers continue to pay attention to social media activism 
in the future and further explore what barriers, if any, currently hinder people from mobilizing 
around social issues on social media platforms. For example, future research can investigate 
what may impede Greenpeace to draw attention to the impact of climate change on northern 
communities on Twitter in the “Boycott the Lego-Shell Partnership” campaign and “Free the 
Arctic 30” campaign. I have discussed the deficiency of online protest action that is proposed by 
some scholars (Lim, 2013; Bromberg, 2013; Schumann & Klein, 2015), but it is difficult to 
evaluate this perspective without further investigation and research. This perspective can be 
better evaluated through conducting further research by looking at more cases of digital activism 
and optimizing the research methods, such as adding fieldwork and interviews as part of the 
research methodologies. This could help social movement actors gain a better understanding of 
the negative effects of social media, such as the surveillance and control of dissent, as well as 
tendencies towards clicktivism, and improve their protest tactics in order to better face these 
challenges.  
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Appendix One 
 
Coding categories for the “Save the Arctic” campaign 
 
➢ Content Producers 
• 350 Australia 
• ABC the Drum 
• Action Aid 
• Alaska Wilderness League 
• Arctic Sunrise 
• Clean Ocean Energy 
• Climate Issues 
• Climate Reality 
• EcoWatch 
• Friends of the Earth 
• GP Activist Network 
• GP Arctic Watch 
• GP Rainbow Warrior 
• GP Volunteering Lab 
• Greenpeace 
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• Greenpeace Africa 
• Greenpeace Andalucia 
• Greenpeace Aus Pac 
• Greenpeace Belgium 
• Greenpeace Bristol 
• Greenpeace Camden 
• Greenpeace Canada 
• Greenpeace Canterbury 
• Greenpeace Cherbourg 
• Greenpeace Czech 
• Greenpeace Dusseldort 
• Greenpeace East Asia 
• Greenpeace Edinburgh 
• Greenpeace EU 
• Greenpeace Euskadi 
• Greenpeace France 
• Greenpeace Germany 
• Greenpeace Hannover 
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• Greenpeace Huddersfield 
• Greenpeace Illes Balears 
• Greenpeace India 
• Greenpeace Japan 
• Greenpeace Korea 
• Greenpeace Leeds 
• Greenpeace Napoli 
• Greenpeace Newcastle 
• Greenpeace Niederrh 
• Greenpeace NL 
• Greenpeace Notts 
• Greenpeace NZ 
• Greenpeace Oxford 
• Greenpeace Pacific Northwest 
• Greenpeace Philippines 
• Greenpeace Pictures 
• Greenpeace Pix 
• Greenpeace Portsmouth 
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• Greenpeace PressDesk 
• Greenpeace Quebec 
• Greenpeace Reunion 
• Greenpeace Russia 
• Greenpeace Shoreditch 
• Greenpeace Slovensko 
• Greenpeace Southeast Asia 
• Greenpeace Southwark (SE London) 
• Greenpeace Southwest London 
• Greenpeace St. Olaf 
• Greenpeace Starsbourg 
• Greenpeace Suomi 
• Greenpeace Sverige 
• Greenpeace Switzerland 
• Greenpeace UK 
• Greenpeace UK Oceans 
• Greenpeace USA 
• Greenpeace Vancouver 
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• Greenpeace Vaud 
• Greenpeace Waltham Forest (East London) 
• HHS Earth Club 
• Imperiled Oceans 
• Local Auckland 
• Lucy Lawless Fan Club Team 
• March for Elephants 
• Mid island News 
• MintPress News 
• Nature for Life Conservation Initiative 
• Protect All Wildlife 
• Save The Arctic 
• Scottish Young Greens 
• Sea Shepherd Balt DC 
• Team4Nature UK 
• the Public Society 
• Wilderness Committee 
• WWF 
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• WWF Australia 
• WWF EU 
• WWF New Zealand 
• WWF Scotland 
• WWF UK 
➢ Content Targets 
• Celebrities 
• Lego 
• Media 
o BBC News 
o Russian News Media 
o YouTube 
o Others 
• Oil Drilling Industry 
o Gazprom 
o Shell 
o Others 
• Online Action 
• Organizations 
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o Arctic Sunrise 
o Do the Green Thing 
o Greenpeace 
o Greenpeace UK 
• Others 
• The Authorities 
o The American Authorities 
o The Australian Politicians 
o The Brazilian Politicians 
o The Canadian Authorities 
o The Indian Politicians 
o The Italian Politicians 
o The New Zealand Politicians 
o The Russian Authorities 
o The South African Politicians 
o The European Court of Human Rights 
o The UK Authorities 
o The UN 
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➢ Text Content Themes 
• a large number of people are engaging in online action 
• ask Lego to stop its partnership with Shell 
• ask politicians from other countries to help release the arctic 30 
• ask Russia to drop piracy charges 
• ask Russia to release the Arctic 30 
• ask audiences to take action to support the campaign 
o ask people to participate in offline action 
o ask people to engage in online action 
• ask to protect the Arctic's environment 
• boycott the oil industry 
o oil pollution is disastrous 
o Shell damages the Arctic (environment) 
• call on celebrities to support 
• call on Gazprom company to free the arctic 30 
• call on media to support 
• call on Shell to help free the arctic 30 
• cite words from influential people as support 
• climate change has increased the Arctic ocean's temperature and the ice's melting speed 
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• compliment activists' action 
• compliment Lego 
• compliment online action 
• concerns about the Arctic 
• condemn the Russian government for using power illegally 
• criticize Greenpeace's campaign 
• criticize online action 
• dissatisfaction with no action from Canadian authorities for the arrested Canadian 
activists 
• dissatisfaction with no action from the UK authorities for the arrested British activists 
• dissatisfaction with UN climate change conference 
• do not support the winter Olympics held by Russia 
• feel concerned about the Arctic 30 
• feel happy for the released Arctic 30 
• feel sad or heartbroken towards the Arctic 30 
• feel sad towards the Lego-Shell partnership 
• grievances about the Lego's partnership with Shell 
• grievances and criticism about Russia's action on the Arctic 30 
• individuals directly sending online support 
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• Italian oil company Eni called on Gazprom to free the Arctic 30 
• justified power cannot be stopped 
• justify the Arctic 30's protest against oil drilling 
• Lego is partnership with Shell 
• Lego love to free the Arctic 30 
• Lego matters to children 
• Lego mini figures are used to protest 
• Lego should support green resources 
• Lego succeeded ending partnership with Shell 
• letters from prison 
• other news 
• protest songs for the Arctic 30 
• Russia refused to release the arctic 30 
• Russian news media blocked the photos against the Arctic Sunrise activist 
• Shell and Lego are polluting kids' imagination 
• Shell uses Lego to clean up its image for dirty oil drilling 
• shocking video about Russian special forces confronting Greenpeace activists 
• stop buying Lego products 
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• support from celebrities 
• support from environmental experts 
• support from human rights advisor 
• support from international authorities 
• support from International Law of Sea Tribunal (UN-mandated tribunal) 
• support from legal experts 
• support from media 
• support from Nobel Peace Laureates 
• support from organizations 
• support from Russian authorities 
• support from the Arctic 30's family 
• support from the Arctic 30's teammates 
• support to Lego 
• thank Lego for stopping the partnership 
• thanks from the Arctic 30 
• thanks to individuals 
• thanks to influential people 
• thanks to organizations 
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• thanks to other countries' politicians 
• the Arctic 30 are captured and detained in Russia for peaceful protest 
• the Arctic 30 are charged with piracy or hooliganism by Russia 
• the Arctic 30 are released 
• the Arctic 30 reunite with their family and friends 
• the Arctic 30's hearings 
• the Arctic 30's stories 
• the Arctic is being threatened by the oil drilling related issues 
• activists are taking offline action 
• the tough situation of the arctic 30 
• touching moments from the Arctic 30 
• YouTube blocks Greenpeace's Lego video 
➢ Link Sharing 
• Academic Source Website 
• Gazprom Website 
• Governmental Websites 
o The Russian government website 
o The UK Parliament website 
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• Letter Writing Website 
• Music Website 
• News Sites  
o ABC 
o BBC 
o Business Insider 
o CBC 
o China Daily 
o CNN 
o Forbes 
o Global News 
o Los Angeles Times 
o others 
o Reuters 
o Sky News 
o The Guardian 
o The Huffington Post 
o The Independent 
o The New York Times 
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o The Times 
o The Wall Street Journal 
o The Washington Post 
• Online Donation Websites 
• Online Petition Websites 
• Organization Websites 
o 350 
o EcoWatch 
o Greenpeace 
o O Dia da Terra 
o other organization webs 
o WWF 
• Personal Websites 
• Search Engine (e.g. Google) 
• Social Media Platforms 
o Facebook 
o Flickr 
o Instagram 
o Others 
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o Tumblr 
o Twitter 
o Vimeo 
o YouTube 
• Tool websites (e.g. Twitter map, Google map or Twibbon) 
➢ Visual Communication 
• Images 
o # tweetspill poster 
o #BlockShell poster 
o #FreetheArctic30 badge 
o #FreetheArctic30 poster - melted icebergs and broken ice 
o #FreetheArctic30 poster - the Arctic Sunrise ship and a cow holding “Free the 
Arctic 30” board 
o #FreetheArctic30 posters 
o #FreetheArctic30 posters - a hand holding free the Arctic Sunrise ship out of the 
ocean 
o #FreetheArctic30 posters- the Arctic 30's photos edited with encouraging words 
o ''#FreetheArctic30'' made with Lego bricks 
o a screenshot from news website 
 143 
o a screenshot of Russian Olympic Game official website 
o a screenshot of the survey showing the majority thinks the Arctic 30 should be 
freed 
o Arctic Sunrise ship is sailing in the ocean (with rainbow and different countries' 
flags) 
o armed Russian Coast Guard officials 
o birds standing on the isolated ice 
o CCTV footage of six men breaking in Greenpeace office 
o dogs wearing supporting words for the Arctic 30 
o drawing (handwriting) from kids or kids are drawing 
o Gandhi monument or drawing 
o Gazprom and Shell's CEOs 
o information poster - a notice of the hearing by International Tribunal for the Law 
of the Sea 
o information poster - supporting event 
o Lego 
▪ a Lego mini figure is painting Shell's brand icon 
▪ a Lego polar bear is standing up and roaring 
▪ kids play Lego toys 
 144 
▪ Lego mini figures (others) 
▪ Lego mini figures - oil workers and polar bears get stuck in the oil spill 
▪ Lego mini figures are celebrating 
▪ Lego mini figures are protesting against Shell 
▪ Lego toys with Shell's logo 
▪ Lego's black bricks are getting close to the polar bear 
▪ Lego's brochures with Shell's logo on 
▪ supporting poster - seals are sadly lying on broken ice (Lego bricks) 
o Obama is holding free the arctic poster 
o offline protest - a pumpkin with free the Arctic slogan 
o offline protest - activists 
o offline protest - activists and life size polar bears 
o offline protest - activists protesting in the cage 
o offline protest - climbing the Eiffel tower or buildings 
o offline protest - holding “happy birthday” poster to the Arctic 30 activists 
o offline protest - information booth 
o offline protest - kids are protesting 
o offline protest - oil spill and Lego theme park 
o offline protest - protest for the Arctic 30 with candles 
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o offline protest - protest poster against Gazprom at the football game 
o offline protest - protest setting with Greenpeace activists' protesting slogan 
o offline protest - protestor and propaganda poster 
o offline protest - protestors and live size Lego figures 
o offline protest - protestors, life size polar bear, life size Lego 
o offline protest - Russian flag is on Arctic Sunrise ship 
o offline protest - supporting billboard 
o offline protest - supporting live concert 
o offline protest - supporting messages on stickers (bird and rainbow) 
o oil drilling and dirty oil spill 
o photo of many people going to Russian court 
o photo of politicians calling to free the Arctic 30 
o photo of the Guardian's newspaper article about the Arctic 30 
o photos of the Arctic 30 protesting 
o photos of the Arctic 30's thanking words 
o Polar bear 
▪ #FreetheArctic30 poster - polar bear 
▪ a contrast of a safe environment for polar bears and an unsafe environment 
▪ a dead polar bear 
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▪ a polar bear is clinging to the edge of a piece of ice 
▪ a polar bear is drowning 
▪ Aurora 
▪ inflatable polar bear dying next to the arctic sunrise ship 
▪ Lego campaign poster - polar bear 
▪ petition website with a polar bear standing on the broken ice 
▪ polar bear and seal are drowning in the oil spill 
▪ polar bear and Shell logo 
▪ polar bear holding Lego bricks and Shell's oil rig 
▪ polar bear is roaring to an oil rig 
▪ polar bear is standing on a Lego brick (analogy-broken ice) 
▪ Polar bears (“high five”) are celebrating 
▪ polar bears are standing on the isolated ice 
▪ polar bears on thin ice 
▪ the painting of a polar bear holding free the Arctic activists’ poster 
o pop culture or celebrity 
o postcard writing poster 
o protesting songs for the Arctic 30 
o screenshots from Greenpeace's videos 
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o a mini Lego figure is crying 
o a unicorn 
o oil is submerging the Arctic creatures 
o screenshots of protesting content being clocked online 
o sketch of the jail cell from the Arctic 30 
o supporting poster - big fish (people) is chasing two small fish (Gazprom and 
Shell) 
o supporting poster with photos of Nobel Peace Laureates 
o supporting poster with written words 
o others 
o quote encouraging words spoken by the Arctic 30 
o quote from Olympic legend John Carlos 
o supporting words from Putin 
o things you can do to support the arctic 30 
o supporting posters for Lego campaign - Lego toys edited with supporting words 
o supporting tattoos 
o supporting writing for the Arctic 30 
o the Arctic 30 protestor is handcuffed or in jail 
o the Arctic broken ice 
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o the Arctic Sunrise ship and isolated ice with a heart made of different national 
flags 
o the beauty of the Arctic 
▪ iceberg 
▪ Polar bear's love 
▪ snowy owl 
o the photo of #FreetheArctic30 watch 
o the photo of politicians from other countries 
o the photo of sad moments of Arctic 30's family 
o the photo of sunrise 
o the photo of the Arctic 30 
o the photo of the arctic 30 being brought to the Investigative Committee 
o the photo of the Arctic 30 reuniting with their family and friends 
o the photo of the arctic 30 with arms raised when they were pointed with guns 
o the photo of the Arctic Sunrise activists leaving with smiles or thumb up 
o the relatives of the Arctic 30 holding supporting poster 
• videos 
o #freekieron 
o #FreeTheArctic30 with Kumi Naidoo 
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o ''30 days of injustice'' Global Day of Solidarity for the Arctic 30 
o ''everything is not awesome'' 
o “Arctic 30” Face 7 Years in Prison for Targeting Russian Gas Drilling 
o 100 years of destruction 
o 50 kids took some giant LEGO bricks to Shell’s offices 
o @faizaoulahsen from @GreenPeace explains action of @gp_sunrise 
#freethearctic30. 
o Action de Greenpeace sur la Tour Eiffel 
o An Arctic Adventure - Words Over Waltham Forest 
o anonymous message to leaders of Russia operation green rights 
o Arctic 30 Detainee Kieron Bryan reacts to news he has been granted bail 
o Arctic 30 Letters from prison 
o Arctic 30 members released on bail 
o Arctic30 Solidarity Flash mob with Rickard Söderberg at the central station in 
Malmö 
o Behind the scene with the Arctic 30 support team 
o celebrities protest for the arctic 30 
o Der sterbende Schwan by Greenpeace 
o first Russians of the arctic 30 released on bail 
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o Free the Arctic 30 #Greenpeace 
o from peaceful action to Russian prison 
o Giant Lego people are protesting offline 
o Greenpeace - Global Warming and Climate Change 
o Greenpeace Promo Video 
o Greenpeace update #FreeTheArctic30 with Kumi Naidoo 
o inspiring action 
o Lego and Shell in NZ...block by block 
o Lego, help children save the arctic 
o Libertad para los 30 activistas de Greenpeace detenidos en Rusia 
o live concerts 
o Masked men enter Greenpeace office grounds 
o protest for the arctic 30 
o Reversed graffiti street art action in solidarity with the arctic 30 
o Russian special forces confronting Greenpeace activists on Gazprom Arctic oil 
rig 
o Russian views on Greenpeace piracy charges 
o save the arctic and free the arctic 
o Save the Arctic from Shell and Gazprom 
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o Stand with the arctic 30 
o Vicious Circle 
o Суд над активистами Greenpeace в Мурманске 
➢ Retweet 
 
 
